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The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and 

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SUPPLEMENT 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CHRONICLE 



Vol. IX APRIL, 1907 No. 2 



THE TREATY OF AMITY, COMMERCE, AND 

NAVIGATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN 

AND THE UNITED STATES. 



EOBEBT E. EANKIN. 



Taken singly, the year 1794 contains the period of 
greatest peril to the American union and its international 
relations which the annals of this country have yet recorded. 
Only eleven years had passed since the treaty of peace was 
signed, closing a vital revolutionary war which had drained 
the resources of the colonies to their utmost. During the 
intervening period of those eleven years one government 
had been established which had proved so inadequate in two 
of its branches that it was laid aside, leaving only hesitancy 
and doubt of a union for the new government to meet. The 
constitution of this new government had been in force but 
five years and had by no means convinced the people that 
it was qualified to administer to their diverse interests. It 
certainly did not embody the unqualified ideas for govern- 
ment of any one man, or of a state, or of a national party, 
and in so far as it failed in this, so far was it carefully 
watched by the statesmen who had formed it. 

Such were the internal conditions. Abroad a bitter war 
existed between England and France and with these two 
countries our international relations were primarily con- 
nected. With England, the mother country, there had been 

* Bryce Historical Prize Essay, 1906. 



JAY'S TBEAT¥, 






a recent war, and since independence had been granted, lier 
attitude had been haughty and overbearing. France had 
been the staunch ally of the American colonies during the 
period of the Revolution and now expected reciprocal aid 
and attention. Racial pride and national interests de- 
manded an amicable relation with Great Britain ; sympathy 
and national gratitude demanded every attention in behalf 
of France. President Washington in his appreciation of 
these conditions aptly described them :^ "To sum the whole 
up in a few words : I have never, since I have been in the 
administration of the government, seen a crisis which, in 
my judgment, has been so pregnant with interesting events, 
nor one from which more is to be apprehended. " * * * 

Of all the policies which presented themselves to this 
government but one met with national approval. That was : 
The United States can not remain uninterested and obliv- 
ious to the opportunities now presented ; it must take some 
definite stand and maintain it. What this policy should be 
was the vital question in the crisis of the administration. 

As a solution of this question and as one of the interest- 
ing events from which much was apprehended the adminis- 
tration decided upon negotiations with England through its 
envoy extraordinary, John Jay. 

But for the success of this envoy at the British court in 
London, the early history of this government would have to 
be rewritten. As is shown in the following pages, war, in 
all likelihood, would have resulted, and for war "the United 
States was never more unprepared. ' ' A conservative state- 
ment maintains that the independence which the colonies 
had so lately won would have suffered greatly. It is hardly 
less conservative to say that independence would have suf- 
fered irredeemably. 

It is with these negotiations that this essay has to deal, 
and a word as to its sources and method of development 



== Washington, "Writings," Vol. XI, p. 48. Cf. Gibbs, ''Memories 
of Wolcott, ' ' Vol. I, p. 327. 



OE THE TBEATY OF 1794. 3 

might be in keeping with a better understanding of the 
subject. 

In regard to sources, this essay has been unusually for- 
tunate in having a large field of original material. The 
greatest contributors to this field have been the American 
State Papers, Foreign Relations, containing all the original 
documents relative to the negotiations, and the Annals of 
Congress, containing all the speeches which embody the 
views of this as well as foreign countries. Besides these, 
there is a great amount of indispensible material which is 
minor only in the quantity, not quality, which it contrib- 
utes. In this class are noted the diaries, letters, speeches, 
and writings of contemporary statesmen who rank among 
the greatest which this or any other country has had the 
fortune to possess. George Washingion, Alexander Hamil- 
ton, and James Madison might head this list. Upon such 
primary sources is the evidence in this essay based. All 
interests contained herein have been taken from first-hand 
materials and the great amount of secondary works ap- 
pended have been used only in cross reference and most 
general considerations. There has been much subsequent 
periodical literature which is of such slight importance as 
hardly to merit attention. However, one exception must be 
made to the general condemnation of periodicals, and that 
is in favor of the contemporary newspapers published at 
Philadelphia, The American Daily Advertiser and the 
Aurora. 

In regard to the development of this subject, several 
methods presented themselves. But upon a summary view 
the material divided itself most naturally into three parts. 
The first part consists of a chronological and narrative his- 
tory of the events which surround the making of the treaty. 
The second part contains an exposition of the principles in- 
volved in the negotiations and in the treaty itself. Finally, 
there appear the subsequent results of these negotiations 
with an explanation of the objects effected by that docu- 



4 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

ment. And there are added other interests which resulted 
from this special mission to England but of which there is 
absolutely no trace or even suggestion in the articles as 
finally ratified by the two nations. 

The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation be- 
tween Great Britain and the United States, or as it was pop- 
ularly called, Jay's Treaty of 1794, affords a study of the 
political, commercial, and international interests during the 
first years of this government. 

I.— THE NAEEATIVE HISTOEY OF THE TEEATY. 

History, by its definition of evolutionary processes, is 
best illustrated in its narration, but its narration in this 
place may serve an additional purpose — ^that of a general 
understanding of the most unpopular treaty which the 
United States ever had the misfortune to contract. 

1. Some of the conditions which led up to this treaty 
were of long standing. Many of them had existed before 
the Revolutionary War. Likewise, there were some arising 
from later reasons. There had been an attempt to settle 
many points of difference in the treaty of peace in 1783, and 
the breaking of certain provisions^ in this treaty was one of 
the main causes demanding a settlement. The retention of 
the forts* in the northern and western parts of the United 
States acted as ' * a thorn in the side of the young republic, ' ' 
and another action equally painful was the ruinous com- 
mercial policy which had been adopted and enforced by the 
British Orders in Council. These had worked special injury 
in the Admiralty Courts of the West Indies, where hun- 
dreds of ships, particularly from New England, had been 
seized and condemned for carrying French produce or pro- 
visions to French ports. The impressment of American 
seamen was another source of irritation. All these direct 

^ Vide Appendix E. 
* Vide p. 18. 



OE TBH TBEATT OF 1794. 5 

causes were harped upon by the spirit of war on the part of 
the New England Democrats. The Republicans over the 
country adopted retaliation in the form of a suspension of 
all commercial relations with Great Britain. Both policies 
pointed directly to war, which was a thing to be dreaded in 
the extreme, owing to our new government and complete 
lack of preparation for any encounter whatsoever. Against 
this popular demand for war, which was voiced in many 
assemblies and made them scorn British relations and re- 
joice in French victories, there was another party which 
realized what war would mean for the United States under 
existing conditions. This party adopted the policy of peace- 
ful negotiations. At the head of this conservative party 
stood President Washington. To his clear insight and 
statesman-like conduct more is due than to any one man of 
his time. Of his conduct more will be said hereafter, but 
at present let the words of the British chronicler suffice: 
''Happily for that country (America) and Great Britain 
itself. General Washington still presided over American 
councils."^ The policy of peace could be assured only by 
immediate negotiations to relieve the tension upon strained 
national relations. The United States had but recently en- 
joyed the honor of receiving an embassador from Great 
Britain. Mr. Hammond was a man whom Fisher Ames 
properly estimated as lacking in prudence and moderation.® 
Our own minister at London, Mr. Pinckney, was a man of 
prejudices and strongly pro-Gallician, although, as Wash- 
ington declared, his confidence in him remained undimin- 
ished.^ 

2. Conditions demanded a special envoy, and Washing- 
ton reasoned that such a representative would serve more 
properly to impress upon the minds of the British admin- 
istrators the seriousness and dignity of the occasion, and to 
insure the British Government that the executive of the 



^ Annual Eegister, 1794, p. 148. 

« Vide "Works." Letter to C. Gore, March 5, 1794, 

^ Message to Senate, April 16, 1794. 



6 JAY'S TBEATY, 

United States intended if possible to maintain neutrality.* 
With an eye to this purpose, his choice first rested upon 
Alexander Hamilton, whose work had shown him a man of 
no mean ability. But Hamilton had many and some bitter 
enemies, and Washington was warned by Monroe that a 
treaty satisfactory in most respects would find opposition on 
the prejudiced grounds that it was Hamilton 's work. Ham- 
ilton was deeply grieved at being laid aside, but proposed 
the name of John Jay to Washington, who immediately as- 
sented. The appointment was laid before the Senate on 
the 19th of April, 1794, and three days of stormy debate 
followed before the Senate confirmed the nomination. The 
final vote stood eighteen in favor and eight against, with 
Aaron Burr and James Monroe of Virginia at the head of 
the opposition. Jay was holding Circuit Court at Phila- 
delphia when his nomination was confirmed, so no time was 
lost in notifying him of his appointment. That he saw the 
difficulties before him can not be doubted. He writes: "I 
will go, foreseeing the consequences to my personal popu- 
larity. * * * The good of my country I believe de- 
mands the sacrifice and I am ready to make it. ' '" He writes 
to his wife upon the 15th of April, 1794, that his dilemma 
lay between personal and public considerations. On the 19th 
he writes in further explanation: "No appointment ever 
operated more unpleasantly upon me, but the public con- 
siderations which were urged, and the manner in which it 
was pressed, strongly irapress me with the conviction that 
to refuse it would be to desert my duty for the sake of my 
ease and domestic concerns and comforts. "^° His personal 
disinclination was not without foundation, for no portion 
of his career has been subject to more unsparing criticism 
than that on which he was about to enter. 

The spirit of the country was not so much in opposition 
to Jay or a treaty which he might negotiate as it was to any 

^ Message to Senate, April 16, 1794. 

° Johnston 's ' ' Life and Correspondence of John Jay, ' ' Vol. IV. 

" Johnston 's ' ' Life and Correspondence of John Jay, ' ' Vol. IV. 



OR TEE TREATY OF 1794. 7 

treaty with Great Britain. This spirit found expression in 
many ways and some of these were in personal attacks upon 
the envoy-elect. This popular spirit is amply illustrated in 
a motion passed in the House of Representatives two days 
after Jay's appointment. This motion was a prohibition 
upon importation of produce of British growth or manufac- 
ture after date. The very apparent purpose was to render 
Jay 's mission nugatory. This motion passed the House and 
was only stopped in the Senate by the casting vote of the 
Vice-President. However, Washington in all probability 
would have vetoed it. 

Jay accepted his appointment to England without vacat- 
ing his office as Chief Justice of the United States, although 
he never afterwards occupied that position. This was, how- 
ever, one of the great objections to his appointment, raised 
by the party in opposition. It is indeed difficult to answer, 
for only imperative necessity and a lack of occupation for 
the Court would authorize this infringement upon the inde- 
pendence of the judiciary. A second objection was to the 
monarchial principles which he is said to have entertained. 
But when this country was debating on whether to receive 
a minister from the French Republic or a regent from the 
monarchy of France, Jay promptly decided to receive no 
regent from a monarchy unless it was one de facto. A third 
objection was his indifference to the navigation rights of 
the Mississippi ; a fourth, his attachment for England ; and 
a fifth, his aversion to France. The latter, in the light 
of subsequent events, seems to have been more properly 
grounded. A sixth objection was a purely political one with 
no international interest. It is best explained in the con- 
flicting views of the north and south. Mr. Adams expressed 
the sentiments of the north when he wrote that if Jay suc- 
ceeded in his undertaking it would be a strong recommen- 
dation for the Presidency. This was what the southern 
states feared as being most directly in opposition to their 
hopes of placing Thomas Jefferson in the Presidential chair. 



8 JAY'S TREATY, 

Jay realized this sacrifice. He said : "No man could form 
a treaty with Great Britain, however advantageous it might 
be to the country, who would not by his agency render him- 
self so unpopular and odious as to blast all hopes of political 
preference. ' ' 

Throughout these early years of our government a con- 
stant conflict will be noticed between what the popular 
parties desired and the policy of the administration. The 
nomination of Jay is a point in evidence. Madison wrote 
to Thomas Jefferson on the 11th of May, 1794, stating that 
this appointment had undergone ' ' the animadversion of the 
press, ' '" and that this action together with the measure for 
a discriminating duty on British tonnage would be a power- 
ful blow upon the popularity of the President. 

The men in power had confidence in John Jay. His 
qualifications "included an unyielding integrity, a keen 
sense of justice, an unusually sound judgment, if not bril- 
liant; freedom from prejudice, and a lofty spirit of pride 
in his country 's honor. ' '^^ He also had experience — to him 
perhaps better than any other man was known the entire 
history of our relations with Great Britain. Contrasted 
with Hamilton, he possessed more experience, by his work 
in the negotiations of the treaty of 1783, greater popularity, 
moderation and freedom from partiality toward either 
Great Britain or France. Hamilton advocated his appoint- 
ment as "the only man in whose qualifications for success 
there would be thorough confidence and him whom alone it 
would be advisable to send. ' ' 

Jay departed for England in the ship "Ohio" on the 
12th of May, 1794.^^ His party consisted of Colonel Trum- 
bull, who was to act as his Secretary, and his son. Upon 
his departure Jay addressed about a thousand of his fellow 
citizens who had collected at the wharf to wish him success 
in his undertaking. Cheers were given and a salute fired 

" Madison 's Letters and Other Writings, Vol. II. 
" American Historical Eeports, 1901, Vol. I. 
^^ American Daily Advertiser, May 14, 1794. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 9 

as his vessel passed out of North River. His voyage was 
made very unpleasant by seasickness, and he was in ill- 
health when he arrived at Falmouth on June 8, 1794. 

3. The quiet journey across England rested him and 
he arrived in London June 15; rented his apartments in 
the Royal Hotel, Pall Mall, and asked for an early inter- 
view with Lord Grenville, the British negotiator. William 
Wyndham, or Lord Grenville, son of the projector of the 
Stamp Act, had been appointed by the King because he was 
a good statesman, well educated, able in ministerial duties, 
stately in bearing, uncompromising in principle, firm in his 
convictions, high toned and honorable. Hardly had Jay 
landed at Falmouth before opposition was started against 
him in America, first in New York. This was not contrary 
to his expectations, for he wrote to "Washington on Sep- 
tember 13, 1794, "that attempts will be made in America 
to frustrate this negotiation, I have not the most distant 
shadow of a doubt. I brought this belief and opinion with 
me."" 

Jay presented his letters of credence to His Majesty 
George III, and the Queen, in politic conformity with Brit- 
ish politeness. This courtesy and good manner was later 
made a point of special objection by the American oppo- 
sition. His reception was so courteous as to reassure the 
administrations of both countries. His letters are filled with 
favorable reports.^^ Without difficulty or delay he entered 
into negotiations with Lord Grenville, which they agreed, 
upon Jay's suggestion, were for the most part to be verbal. 
4. Certain maritime and commercial controversies were 
first taken up, followed by negotiations upon treaty viola- 
I tions. From this point the negotiations became more in 

'^ detail. As a settlement was neared, projected treaties were 
\ written up by each and submitted to the other for objections 
and elimin ations. By this process articles which could not 
"Johnston's "Correspondence and Public Papers on John Jav " 

Vol. IV. !:■ J} 

"Appendix A (2). 



10 JAY'S TBEATY, 

be agreed upon were thrown out and certain modifications 
in other articles were finally settled upon. Throughout the 
entire negotiations the utmost harmony prevailed and ex- 
pressions of great respect were exchanged even after Jay 
had returned to America. Upon Jay's first meeting with 
Lord Grenville he expressed sentiments very favorable to 
his character and manner, adding that "if his disposition 
is hostile he conceals it admirably. ' ' Jay's own conduct was 
outlined by himself in a letter to Eandolph, to acquire "the 
confidence and esteem of the Government, not by improper 
compliances, but by that sincerity, candor, truth and pru- 
dence, which in my opinion will always prove to be more 
wise and effectual than finesse and chicane. ' ' 

A reading of the treaty convinces one of the dictatorial 
attitude assumed by the British Government. This can be 
accounted for as the result of a treaty with a more powerful 
nation, by the necessity which Jay felt of forming a treaty 
of some kind, and by the previous knowledge Grenville had 
of Jay's character and how best to approach him. The 
statesmen of that day did not live so much in the light of 
the public press. Therefore, the little biographical sketch^'' 
of Jay's character, penned by Mr. Elliott, a former Lieu- 
tenant-Governor of New York, and sent to Grenville by 
Lord Auckland, was of great use. It was of much greater 



^^ This was sent on the 22d of June, 1794, in anticipation of Jay 's 
mission. Its accuracy and the purchase it gave Grenville in approach- 
ing Jay authorizes it in full : "I have known Mr. Jay 's character in- 
timately from his outset in public life. He was originally under me 
in adjusting some boundary lines of the Provinces. He has good 
sense and much information; has great appearance of coolness, and is 
a patient hearer vsdth a good memory. He argues closely, but is long- 
winded and self-opinioned. He can bear any opposition to what he 
advances, provided that regard is shown to his abilities. He may be 
attacked by good treatment, but will be unforgiving if he thinks him- 
self neglected; he will expect to be looked up to, not merely as an 
American agent, but as Mr. Jay, who was in Spain, who has been high 
in ofla.ce from the beginning. On the whole, they could not have made 
a better choice, as he certainly has good sense and judgment, both of 
which must have been mellowed since I saw him ; but almost every man 
has a weak and assailable quarter, and Mr. Jay's weak side is Mr. 
Jay." Grenville Correspondences, Vol. II, p. 578. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 11 

value when Mr. Jay had declared his attitude to be one 
' ' rather to accommodate than convict or convince. ' ' 

The negotiations finally came to a satisfactory settle- 
ment upon the 19th of November, 1794. The document was 
signed at St. James Square, where most of the negotiations 
had been carried on. 

The original and duplicate copies of the treaty were sent 
by two different packets from London to America. 

They raced across the Atlantic to place the treaty in the 
hands of the President before Congress adjourned. The 
first packet to reach the American shore arrived at Norfolk, 
Virginia, where a special messenger was dispatched and 
arrived at Philadelphia, mud-bespattered, frost-bitten, and 
fatigued, on the 7th of March, 1795. Congress had ad- 
journed seven days before. 

5. A special meeting of the Senate was called for June 
8, 1795, and as soon as a quorum was present debate began 
upon the treaty. Ratification was advised on June 24. At 
the beginning of the session a motion was passed that all 
discussion be kept secret. So the debates were never en- 
tered in the proceedings of the Senate. The fact that 
neither the discussions nor the treaty was made public 
aroused the suspicions of the Republicans. People all over 
the country desired to see the treaty, and when it was with- 
held some of the most vile and violent opposition was com- 
menced before the content of the treaty was even known. 
The country was divided by party animosities and political 
questions. The opposition to the treaty, instigated by the 
tyrannical madness of French influence, gave expressions to 
feelings which the press of this country has never again 
ventured upon.^'^ It can be described as an importation of 
, that spirit which agitated France. 

' This spirit was first directed against that conservative 

and cautious body, the United States Senate. Upon their 
i advocation of the President's ratification the condemnation 

/ " Vide Appendix C. 



12 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

of that body was exceedingly severe, and all the force of 
the opposition was turned against the President to suppli- 
cate, persuade, and threaten him into a refusal of its ratifi- 
cation. Washington carefully listened to all the arguments 
which were brought to bear and after mature consideration 
signed the treaty as it had been handed to him by the Senate, 
that is, with the exception of the twelfth article, regarding 
West India trade. The crisis was reached at the moment 
of this decision, but minor questions which were involved 
agitated the public until long after. 

Notwithstanding the admiration and respect in which 
Washington was held, it can not be supposed that he would 
escape any of the severe criticism which was given so gener- 
ously by the party in opposition upon any one in favor of 
the ratification of Jay's treaty. Among unjust criticisms 
was the suggestion of the impeachment of the national ex- 
ecutive as a remedy for the absolute disrespect of the desires 
of that party which called itself the people. 

While these party contentions were going on Jay re- 
turned to America, May 28, 1795. He had remained in 
England because his health would not permit a winter voy- 
age and that he might attend to any matters which should 
arise from the consideration of the treaty in America. He 
received a warm welcome from his fellow-citizens, more 
warmly tendered because of his election two days before his 
arrival to the governorship of the state of New York. He 
thereupon resigned the Chief Justiceship in the United 
States Supreme Court, June 29, 1795. This strange contra- 
diction on the part of the citizens of New York to Jay's 
national condemnation serves to prove that it was not Jay, 
personally, but the treaty itself which was so despised. 

It is quite characteristic of the man that in the fierce 
war of speeches and pamphlets which continued during the 
period of ratification Jay took absolutely no part. He did 
not write even an anonymous letter or by word or action 
influence the President or Senate in a matter whose inter- 



OB TEE TREATY OF 1794. 13 

ests he had more carefully studied out than any other states- 
man in America. The opposition to the treaty reached its 
height during the debate in the Senate. It was caused by 
the untimely publication of the treaty. Notwithstanding 
all the secrecy which was attempted by the Senate, some one 
saw a copy which the Senators were given for consideration 
and later wrote down for publication all he could recall 
from memory. It was so advertised in the Aurora of Phila- 
delphia. Naturally there were many inaccuracies in the 
statements, and Stephen Thompson Mason, a strong Re- 
publican from Virginia, determined that the people should 
not be misled. Contrary to the resolution of the Senate, he 
sent his copy to Benjamin F. Bache, and on the morning of 
July 2, 1795, the treaty appeared in full in the American 
Daily Advertiser. Pamphlets containing the treaty were 
immediately struck off and packages of these were sent, wet 
from the press, to every large town in the union. At noon 
on July 2 they could be bought in New York City and on 
the 6th of July they were for sale in Boston. Mason's 
praise was sounded far and wide as a Senator with the in- 
terests of the people at heart. 

The popular opposition to the treaty was strongly re- 
vived when the bill for appropriating necessary funds to 
put the treaty into execution came before the House of 
Representatives. The sentiments of the party were: We 
have appealed to the Senate and President alike to refuse 
the ratification of this treaty. They have alike ignored the 
will of the people. Let us now appeal to these men who are 
our direct representatives and therefore have interests in 
common with the people; who are not afraid of war with 
Great Britain, and who are in sympathy with the independ- 
ence seekers of France, The result was the first instance in 
the history of this country when the discretionary power of 
the House of Representatives in regard to treaty appropria- 
tions was strongly and enthusiastically maintained by a 
majority of the House. The precedent here established is 
left for discussion under constitutional law. 



14 JAY'S TBEATY, 

Congress was called for November 3, 1795, and the 
House reported a quorum for business open tbe 4tli instant. 
The Senate did not have a quorum until the 19th, when they 
were jointly addressed by the President. A few minor mat- 
ters were settled and the main topic of the session was taken 
up — an appropriation for the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, 
and Navigation with Great Britain. Debate upon the treaty 
began with a motion by Edward Livingston of New York, 
calling on the President for the instructions to Jay as 
Envoy Extraordinary. This was passed March 2, 1796. 
President Washington refused to comply with this request 
in a document dated March 30, 1796. The debate upon this 
question continued from March 7 to April 7. Finally the 
treaty was debated article by article and as a whole, and 
the congressional records in this particular give some of 
the best speeches in the history of its congressmen. The 
appropriation was finally granted in an act passed May 8, 
1796. The persistent advocates of the treaty had won. 
Their victory was based upon sound reason and unflinching 
toil. The last appeal of the opposition, that is, to the senti- 
ments of the House, had failed. To illustrate how bold some 
of these appeals to sentiment were, on the 4th of January, 
1796, when the House had met to consider the appropriation 
for Jay's treaty, a beautiful French flag was presented to 
the government. It was received with loud acclamation. 
After the failure of sentiment, the cause and party retired 
from the field, leaving only its unenviable record for history. 

II.— THE POLITICAL HISTOEY OF THE TEEATY. 

The political history of the treaty deals with the declar- 
ation and establishment of principles which had either been 
violated or which were to govern the conduct of the two 
nations in the future. They are here regarded as first dis- 
cussed and then embodied in an international contract as 
adopted by the contracting governments. While treaties 



OB THE TBEATY OF 1794. 15 

may be formed during tlie most amicable relations, the 
treaty of 1794 had, as its great cause, the settlement of 
differences. 

1. For years a treaty of commerce had been desired 
with Great Britain. It was felt that for want of it, trade 
was "manifestly declining" and might be "entirely 
ruined. "^^ Attempts had been constantly made to nego- 
tiate a treaty. The Peace Commission of 1783 was so em- 
powered, but was unsuccessful. Special powers were 
granted to the American Commission, consisting of Adams, 
Franklin, and Jay, ten days after the signing of the treaty 
of peace. Their success was no better than that of the Peace 
Commission. Power was then granted to John Adams when 
he was sent as minister to London in 1785, to Governor 
Morris when he succeeded Adams in 1789, and to Morris' 
successor, Thomas Pinckney, in 1792. An attempt to force 
England to agree to a treaty was part of a policy of the ex- 
isting administration. This is illustrated by the arguments 
in all legislative bodies for a more energetic government 
which would inspire a dread reprisal and by the bills be- 
fore the House of Representatives in the session of 1794, 
discriminating between nations having and not having trea- 
ties with this government, by levying heavier duties on those 
countries not protected by special regulations.^'' On March 
26, 1794, an embargo was laid against British ships for 
thirty days, and at the end of that period renewed for an- 
other thirty days. The day following the levying of this 
embargo, March 27, Mr. Dayton of New Jersey moved to 
sequester all money due British creditors and use the same 
as an indemnity for the losses of ship owners. On April 21 
the Republicans moved to suspend all commercial relations 
with Great Britain. These were motions which in the par- 
lance of international law are termed "measures short of 
actual war. ' ' 



" Letter of Stephen Higginson, April, 1784. Annual Eeport of 
American Historical Association, 1896, Vol. I. 

" State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. I, p. 711. Cf. Lalor 's 
Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Vol. II, p. 654, 



16 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

Therefore, the determination to send a special envoy to 
England was a bold and decided resolution, fraught with 
severe reproach and censure, but years later culminating in 
good. The policy was carried out in the face of strong op- 
position. It was the administration which demanded a 
treaty with Great Britain. This aggravated the party in 
sympathy with France, for they recognized the final prohi- 
bition of any closer alliance with that nation. The violence 
found in the "love-frenzy" for the French people and the 
intemperate language of the Democratic press was assisted 
by men high in office in the government. The report of 
Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, is a point in evidence. 
When popular resentment had become excited, Jefferson 
made a report on the privileges and restrictions of the com- 
merce of the United States in foreign countries. In this 
pamphlet American relations with Great Britain appeared 
very unfavorable. The report was biased, "the fallacies and 
falsehoods * * * are sufficient proof that the avowed 
tendency of the whole report is to recommend a closer con- 
nection with France, and to inculcate the expediency of a 
direct commercial hostility with Great Britain. ' '^^ Madison 
in his resolution before the House of Representatives showed 
the same hostile spirit. It is therefore quite plain that this 
long standing desire for a treaty did not come from the 
people. 

There was no reply to the courtesy of sending ministers 
to England until 1791, when that government was repre- 
sented by Mr. Hammond. Therefore there must have been 
other reasons besides the desires for a treaty which induced 
Great Britain to accept the opportunity for negotiations. 
The instructions^^ to Jay furnish the additional reasons. 

There are two great sets of questions which produced 
this international contract. First, those questions arising 
from the war in Europe under which the vexations and 



Corbett, "Porcupine Works/' Vol. II, p. 526. 
See Appendix A (1). 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 17 

spoliations of our commerce may be placed ; second, the in- 
fractions of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. 

Probably no special envoy would have been considered 
for a commercial convention, but the differences of the two 
countries upon the water made a special mission to Great 
Britain possible.^^ The declaration of war by France on 
February 1, 1793, against England and Holland seriously 
endangered the prosperity of the United States. A large 
part of our trade went to France and French colonies, but 
England patrolled the ocean, boarded our vessels and seized 
French goods at will. By such conduct Britain injured the 
commerce of France and prevented other powers from as- 
sisting her. This wholesale search of American vessels was 
instigated by the Orders of Council commanding British 
ships to stop all vessels bound for France and take any 
articles listed for that country. Its effect upon our com- 
merce was as disastrous as the rigid enforcement of the rule 
of 1756 in regard to the West India trade. This rule for- 
bade a country to carry on in time of war a trade which was 
interdicted to it in time of peace. After a few years of 
application it was relaxed, but always in regard to our trade 
with the British West Indies it was strictly enforced. 

Another cause of the treaty was the impressment of 
American seamen and their retention in service contrary to 
their wishes. Great Britain had instituted these measures 
in an endeavor * ' to deprive us as far as possible of an active 
commerce in our own bottoms, "^^ since she had grown ap- 
prehensive of the large and increasing carrying power of 
the United States. America was properly incensed and 
Congress waxed warm in debates over retaliatory duties, 
preparations for war and the levying of embargoes. 

But Great Britain enjoyed an immense harvest from her 
loose relations with America, and this was recognized by all 
the statesmen who attempted negotiations.-* Her situation 

^^ State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I, p. 711. 

2^ Hamilton, "The Federalist," Paper XI. 

" State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I, p. 712. 



18 JAY'S THE ATT, 

enabled her to abuse our commerce in another way, through 
her declaration that provisions were contraband of war. 
Since 1650 military and naval stores had been so recognized 
in international law, but provisions had been left undecided. 
Great Britain wished to establish the principle that pro- 
visions were to be so considered unless especially provided 
for by contracting parties,^'* and her legislation was directed 
to that end. Jay's treaty came at that unfortunate period 
when Great Britain wished to establish the contraband char- 
acter of provisions. That nation was therefore extremely 
hard upon our trade, but showed a proper consideration for 
that of other countries.-® 

But there were interests on the American continent 
which also gave rise to the treaty. The New England fishing 
interests spoke loudly for war as a remedy against the Brit- 
ish invasion of their waters. This complaint was echoed 
among the ship owners. 

Then there were the violations of the treaty of peace. 
Matters which had run over and demanded settlement were : 
First, the debts which were owed by Americans to British 
creditors at the time of the Kevolution, arising principally 
from confiscated estates. The decisions of the American 
courts in regard to these debts can not be impeached. They 
were not paid at the time because the demands were large 
and the distress for money was extreme. Every available 
amount of money was put into an extensive foreign com- 
merce. Furthermore, a cloud of war overshadowed the 
country. Second, compensation for the slaves carried away 
upon the evacuation of this country by the British troops 
after the war. Third, the retention of the British forts^'^ 
in the northern and northwestern parts of the United States. 
These British garrisons were a menace to the settlement of 

^ British treaties whicli illustrate this principle are with France, 
1667, 1668; Spain, 1713; Denmark, 1782; Eussia, 1804. 

^^ Orders so effecting our commerce were issued upon November 6, 
1793; January 8 and 25, March 18, and August 18, 1794. 

" Vide Appendix E and Map. Cf. p. 4. 



OB TEE TBEATY OF 1794. 19 

the country around them^^ and to the navigation of the St. 
Lawrence Kiver and the Great Lakes. In addition to this, 
President Washington made strong protests to the British 
King against the purposing of these garrisons to incite the 
barbarous Indians of the frontiers to massacre the settlers.^* 

The treaty of 1783 is of interest in this connection only 
in so far as its violations gave rise to Jay's treaty of 1794. 
These violations have been cited above, yet it would be 
ignoring an important part of the negotiations, leading up 
to and including those on the Jay treaty, if no mention was 
made of the infraction of our first international compact. 

The question as to which country made the first viola- 
tion of the treaty of peace came up when the attempt was 
made on the part of the British to obtain compensation for 
the sequestration of debts and on the part of the Americans 
for the exportation of negroes. A long and complete dis- 
cussion followed between Mr. Hammond and Mr. Jefferson. 
This is one of the finest dissertations on the principles of 
international law and relations which have ever been given 
in the history of foreign affairs.^" At the end of the discus- 
sion Mr. Hammond found himself greatly outclassed. The 
argument is of far too great length and of too much detail 
to be given here. Only a brief summary can be allowed. 
Jefferson maintained that the first violation consisted in the 



^^ Captain Williamson commenced a settlement near Great Soders, 
N. Y., when he was visited on August 16, 1795, by Governor Simcoe, 
who left this declaration in behalf of the British Government : "I am 
commanded to declare that during the inexecution of the treaty of 
peace between Great Britain and the United States, and until the ex- 
isting differences respecting it shall be mutually and finally adjusted, 
the taking possession of any part of the Indian territory, either for 
the purpose of war or sovereignty, is held to be a direct violence of 
His Majesty's rights, as they unquestionably existed before the treaty, 
and has an immediate tendency to interrupt, and in its progress to 
destroy, that good understanding which has hitherto existed between 
His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America. I therefore 
require you to desist from any such aggression." Grenville Corre- 
spondence, Vol. Ill, p. 530. 

^° Complaint was made of Governor Simcoe and Lord Dorchester, 
State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. I. 

'" State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. I. 



20 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

embarking of the negroes and the retention of the military 
posts. Hammond argued that the first violation came in 
regard to the fraudulent procedure against British creditors. 
The solution of the whole matter lay in the fact that 
there had been violations of the treaty upon both sides. 
The question as to the priority of the exportation of the 
negroes or of the confiscation of British debts is one of ex- 
treme difficulty and with which this essay has no concern. 
However, the government of America, at that time, was 
under the Articles of Confederation, the weakness of which 
was perfectly understood by Great Britain. That the Con- 
federate Government did all in its power to comply with 
the treaty can not be doubted. But there were no courts 
to interpret that contract and no executive to enforce it. 
All the central government could do was to recommend, 
which it did beyond all blame. On the other hand, the 
British government was fully capable of carrying out its 
part of the contract, but refrained, perhaps justly, until 
the Confederate Government would carry out its stipula- 
tions. As soon as a government was formed in America 
capable of executing a treaty, the treaty of 1794 resulted. 

The final cause of this treaty is not found in any viola- 
tion of contract. It was a protest by a part of the people 
against a closer alliance with France. It can only be ex- 
plained by the conflict in policy of two political parties. 

Putting aside those who held extreme views, there were 
two clearly defined parties in the government. One recog- 
nized the commercial dependency of the United States upon 
Great Britain, felt a racial sympathy with the people of 
that nation and an admiration for the forms of the British 
constitution. They were indifferent to the progress of the 
French Revolution and cast indignant glances upon the 
blase insolence of the French government. The party held 
a firm faith that the American people, when recovered from 
the bitterness of the revolution, would endorse a more affec- 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 21 

tionate union with the English people than could be main- 
tained with France. Their policy was for a close alliance 
with England and to deal with the French government in 
the strictest and narrowest interpretations of the treaty 
obligations. 

The other party sympathized earnestly and naturally 
with the French Republic. Trescot vividly describes their 
attitude : They saw all the horrors of a terrible revolution, 
but saw them only as the unavoidable convulsions of a dying 
despotism, so pitied and palliated what they could not jus- 
tify. They regard the conduct of Great Britain as an in- 
solent manifestation of superior force, intended to mortify 
national pride and injure national interests, and they would 
gladly have severed all commercial connection with the Eng- 
lish people. So strong was this party that Mr. Pinckney 
writes : "Not only the King but most of his courtiers, and 
(except the Pole) all the foreign ministers, seem to consider 
the Americans as united in principle with the French. ' '^^ 

The administration had attempted to follow a course be- 
tween these two interests. That policy now threatened great 
commercial detriment, as did a closer alliance with France. 
The administration, holding for the British party and for 
the accomplishment of all that party stood for, desired the 
treaty. Jay's mission was the first step toward the execu- 
tion of its policy. If it succeeded the French sympathizers 
knew there would be no closer alliance with the allies of the 
revolution. It succeeded. 

Out of all the causes which occasioned the treaty each 
may be placed under one of the following heads : The long- 
standing desire and the legislative measures projective of a 
commercial treaty; commercial interests arising from the 
European war ; infractions of the treaty of 1783 ; and na- 
tional political relations. 

2. If the negotiations should succeed in settling the 
differences which caused the treaty, the avoidance of war 
" Pinckney 's Letter Book, Vol. I, p. 74. 



22 JAY'S TREATY, 

and the attainment of certain commercial privileges would 
result. But the administrators of the American govern- 
ment realized that the mission could not accomplish all that 
the instructions to Jay demanded,^^ and in the discussion 
concerning the making of the treaty the most attention will 
be paid to the projects which failed, leaving the terms of 
agreement for a discussion under the treaty, article by 
article. 

The atmosphere in which the negotiations were carried 
on was influenced by French jealousies, by the wounded 
pride of Great Britain at American independence, and by 
the neglect of American wrongs under the rejoicing and ex- 
citement of victories over the French, particularly to the 
contemporary defeat of the French fleet by Lord Howe. 
But the sincerity and candor of the two negotiators led to 
a degree of mutual confidence which greatly facilitated 
their labors. A more intimate acquaintance of the negotia- 
tors was permitted by the long delay in negotiations owing 
to a change in the ministry of England and on account of 
the foreign war. Until negotiations were finished it was 
agreed that affairs should remain in statu quo. 

By the last of July, 1794, such a complete understand- 
ing of the wishes of the two countries had been reached in 
personal meetings that written communications were ex- 
changed.^^ Jay's first communication was relative to the 
captures and condemnations of American vessels. Gren- 
ville's reply upon August 1st insured justice, which if not 
provided for in the courts should be obtained by govern- 
mental regulations.^* With regard to all differences Jay 
was constantly supplied with evidence and suggestive infor- 
mation by Secretary of State Randolph. 

Matters progressed smoothly until a dispute arose as to 
the first breaking of the treaty of 1783. The discussion for 
the most part was carried on verbally and only the result is 

^ Vide Appendix A. 

^ These are given in full in State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I. 

^ Article VII of the treaty. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 23 

given by Jay, ' ' on that point we could reach no agreement. ' ' 
Kandolph wrote back immediately, stating such a question 
should not be passed without some decision, but Jay replied 
it was impossible to come to any agreement whatever. 

The infraction of the treaty naturally involved the de- 
mands of compensation for the slaves which were taken 
from the American owners. On this question we have the 
same brief report of a lack of agreement. Jay was severely 
criticized upon this point as allowing his personal prejudice 
against slavery to weaken his ardor in demanding compen- 
sation in behalf of slavery interests. This interest particu- 
larly affected the south, and their loss, which was very 
heavy,^° accounts for the bitter antagonism toward Jay and 
the treaty.^* The principle upon which they demanded 
compensation is perfectly clear. 

During the war of the Revolution many slaves took ad- 
vantage of the opportunity to escape from their masters and 
enter the British lines. By the rules of international law in 
times of war, they became British property. But Great 
Britain, by an act of Parliament, had previously abolished 
all slavery, so these fugitives became free. So far as Amer- 
ican ownership was concerned, they were British property, 
subject to British rule, and the military officials decided 
upon the exportation of these negroes in the vessels carrying 
away the British troops after the war. 

For this purpose a large number of certificates were 
printed, stamped by the United States Government and 
issued to those slaves allowed to go free. When the time 
came for the evacuation of the towns along the coast, these 
certificates were plentifully distributed by the British offi- 
cials among all the slaves desiring to embark and who were 
not included under the legal captures of an enemy. "When 
the United States officials inspected the ships they found 
every slave provided with a legal certificate, and though he 



Vide pp. 68-69. 

Vide Appendix C (3). 



24 JAY'S TBEATY, 

might have been their personal property, lately escaped, 
they were powerless. 

When an attempt was made to recover from the illegal 
action of the military officers, Great Britain maintained 
that the slaves embarked were provided with certificates, a 
fact to which the United States government officials could 
testify. Therefore any objection to the exportation of slaves 
was unjustified. 

In support of this declaration they used the argument 
that the treaty was "an engagement not to cause any de- 
struction, nor to carry away any property of the American 
inhabitants, * * * that no alteration in the actual state 
of property was operated or intended by that article ; that 
every slave, like every horse, which escaped or strayed from 
within the American lines, and came into the possession of 
the British army, became by the laws and rights of war 
British property; and therefore ceased to be American 
property, the exportation thereof was not inhibited by the 
stipulation in question. ' ' The British government was per- 
fectly right in one particular, but this argument does not 
apply to all the slaves in question. Jay states : We could 
not agree concerning the negroes. Was that reason to for- 
feit the treaty ? 

There were two other causes of the treaty which were 
lost in the process of negotiations. The impressment of 
American seamen was stated by Grenville to be contrary to 
the desire of the King. The complaint was to be looked 
after. Upon anything further it was impossible for the two 
countries to agree, and the matter was dropped. Likewise, 
regarding the Orders of Council, that provisions for French 
ports should be contraband, no agreement could be reached, 
but an indemnity for past spoliations was provided for 
under the seventh article. 

Upon the refusal of Great Britain to satisfy the demands 
of the American government in the above respects, the equal 
footing which had been maintained between the two gov- 



OB THE TBJEATY OF 1794. 25 

ernments was lost. At this point the spirit and word of 
Jay's instructions seem to have been forgotten. This can 
be entirely accounted for as a result of a treaty between a 
powerful nation and one seeking favor. 

On August 30, 1794, Grenville transmitted to Jay two 
projects for a treaty. The first regulated various points in 
dispute and contained eleven articles. The second estab- 
lished commercial regulations in seven articles. Jay re- 
turned the projects on September 5 with marginal notes 
and additions. The greatest point of dispute at this time 
was Jay's demand for a compensation arising from the re- 
tention of the forts in the north. Grenville acknowledged 
that compensation was due for this violation of the treaty of 
1783, but maintained that the privilege of trading with the 
West Indies provided for any claims of that character. The 
matter was settled by this argument. From a discussion of 
Grenville 's projects and further agreements. Jay prepared 
a compact which with a few alterations became the docu- 
ment finally signed on the morning of November 19, 1794. 

During the negotiation there was but one letter from 
Jay which threw any considerable light upon the proceed- 
ings of the negotiations. Correspondence had been limited 
because of lack of time, the great distance which was not so 
easily overcome in those days, and the dangers arising from 
the capture of important letters. The letter which gave the 
government in America the first hint as to the trend of 
affairs was very unsatisfactory. It was immediately an- 
swered by Randolph, and the only letter of complaint which 
might have urged Jay to a more uncompromising policy 
left America on the 12th of November, much too late to 
have any influence in the making of the treaty. Randolph 's 
two main objections were that a twelve years' treaty with 
Europe and a two years' treaty with the West Indies would 
probably be very unsatisfactory to the people. Further- 
more, the commercial project of Grenville did not secure 
the particular privileges and exemptions which this country 



26 JAY'S TREATY, 

enjoyed by proclamation, compared with other foreign na- 
tions. 

Pinckney and Jay believed all had been attained which 
Great Britain would submit to, and this decision is un- 
doubtedly true. Whatever weaknesses are found in the 
treaty which grew out of these negotiations must be attrib- 
uted either to the fact that a weak power always treats 
under disadvantages, or to the over ardent desire of the 
negotiator for peace, friendship, and good will with Great 
Britain. 

While these negotiations were going on, the British 
people, absorbed in their continental war, paid little atten- 
tion to its advancement. In America definite information 
was demanded to relieve the excitement of the people. Con- 
gress prolonged its session, waiting for information or re- 
sults. Results came — the treaty itself. 

3. Jay's instructions were divided upon three great 
principles, and the treaty in its final form can be properly 
divided into articles relating to these divisions. 

The first ten articles are permanent and relate to condi- 
tions which were contrary to the stipulations of the treaty 
of 1783. The remaining articles, excepting the twelfth, are 
limited in their duration to twelve years, and are divided 
into those which relate to the commercial difficulties — 
Articles X to XXV, and those relating to citizens and sub- 
jects of the respective countries. The whole treaty con- 
sisted of twenty-eight articles, and with the exception of a 
very few, each was subjected to criticism and opposition on 
the one hand and argument and support upon the other. 

Article I as a peace stipulation was objected to by the 
French and their sympathizers. The title "Treaty of 
Amity" was severely criticized in the light of wrongs of 
which the United States had been the subject.^'^ 

Article II. The British were required to evacuate their 
forts^^ by the 1st of June, 1796, and unless the settlers de- 

" For a synopsis of the treaty and subsequent articles relative 
thereto, Vide Appendix B. 
^' Appendix E. 



OB THE TEE AT Y OF 1794. 27 

clared special allegiance to Great Britain, they became citi- 
zens of the United States. 

The objection to this article was: It provided no in- 
demnity for losses caused by the retention of the forts, but 
established British colonies upon the weak frontier. The 
evacuation of the posts was considered entirely too late, and 
in return for British depredations upon American com- 
merce, this government invited them to an equal participa- 
tion in the interior traffic of the United States. The evacu- 
ation of the posts, it is true, was set at a late date, but the 
purpose of a late evacuation was to insure against violations 
of the treaty of 1794 such as had been committed against 
the treaty of peace. 

Some of the posts were very important not only as har- 
bors on the lakes but as trading centers for the inland 
country. Detroit was the largest of these and had a popu- 
lation of about three thousand souls.^® 

Article III allows the subjects of Great Britain, the 
citizens of the United States, and the Indians of the terri- 
tories to pass freely from one country to the other. Vessels 
belonging to the United States are not to be admitted into 
the ports of His Majesty's said territories, nor British ves- 
sels into rivers of the United States, beyond the highest 
ports of entry for foreign vessels from the sea. There shall 
be a regular exchange of goods between inhabitants of both 
countries. 

Jay considered this one of the most important articles 
in the treaty.**' The advantages were not reciprocal, al- 
though very often so considered. The advantages the 
United States expected were an influence over the Indians 
and a participation in the fur trade. The first was impeded 
by the presence of a British population at the military posts 
and the second was defeated by a monopoly of the fur trade 
because of the superiority of British capital and the low 
duties paid on goods imported for that trade into Canada. 

^^ Grenville Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 611. 

*" Letters of November 21, 1794. State Papers, Foreign Eelations, 
Vol. I. 



28 JAY'S TBEATY, 

Article IV and V stipulated for boundary lines in the 
northwest and northeast, but any boundary lines were ob- 
jected to, otherwise than the sea. 

Article VI was highly objectionable. It provided for 
the payment of debts due the British creditors before the 
peace of 1783, and was considered to be paying a debt which 
was never contracted. There was no limit on the amount 
due, and so was open to every chance of fraud. If there 
were any debts, said the opposition, they should be remedied 
by judicial procedure or a compromise between the parties. 
These objections were not without foundation and several 
years passed before an explanatory article brought the dis- 
pute to a conclusion.*^ But Jay informed Randolph that 
this article was a sine qua non.^^ 

Article VII, providing for American claims, was ob- 
jected to as not being complete and sufficient, although the 
results thoroughly discredit such a criticism. It must have 
been a delicate matter to obtain such a concession from 
Great Britain, as it practically amounted to an admission 
that the Orders of Council were in violation of neutrality. 
The words ''irregular" and "illegal" were skillfully 
adopted to avoid any unnecessary wounds upon British 
pride. Subsequent events prove this one of the most im- 
portant if not the most important article in the treaty of 
1794. 

Article VIII provides for the commissions under the 
sixth and seven articles, and is one of the few against which 
there was no direct objection. 

Article IX. It is agreed that British subjects holding 
lands in the United States and Americans holding lands in 
Great Britain shaU continue to possess the same and all 
rights relating thereto ; that neither subjects or citizens shall 
be regarded as aliens. 



^ Vide p. 57. 

** Letter of November 19, 1794. State Papers, Foreign Eelations, 
Vol. I. Vide Appendix A (3). 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 29 

The article was passed uncensured witli the exception of 
some newspaper abuse. 

Article X stipulates that there shall be no confiscation 
of debts in case of war between the parties. This was ob- 
jected to on the one hand, because the right of confiscation 
may contribute to preserve the peace of the country and 
protect the rights and property of the citizens. On the 
other hand, it was declared to be an article of extreme com- 
plexity, resembling reciprocity, but in reality containing no 
reciprocity at all. Great Britain gained all the advantage 
in that she had larger funds and private interests in the 
United States than Americans had in England. However 
that may be, the clause was obviously just, and was, in addi- 
tion, a novelty in international diplomacy and a distinct 
advancement in civilization. Notwithstanding the advan- 
tage England may have received at the time, the principle 
here established saved millions for the United States in the 
war of 1812, when that government was on the creditor list 
and England upon the debtor. 

This closes the division of permanent articles, from 
which more was gained than from the temporary stipula- 
tions. This is accounted for by the precedents of the treaty 
of 1783, upon which the American negotiator could base 
such claims as the evacuation of the forts, compensation for 
spoliation of navigation, and the settlement of the boundary 
line. But in the commercial treaty it was more a matter of 
what one nation was willing to give and the other to receive. 
There had been no precedent established by a commercial 
treaty before this date. 

According to many economic notions of the day, Eng- 
land had little to gain and much to lose by a commercial 
compact with America. This part of the treaty was limited 
in duration because of the rapid growth of our commercial 
interests.*^ Jay wrote to Washington that "the commercial 
part of the treaty was of short duration as things more 
auspicious to negotiate upon will probably arise." 

« Vide Part III, Section 3. 



30 JAY'S TEEATY, 

Although the permanent part of the treaty had been 
subject to severe criticism, it was the commercial articles 
which excited most hostility. 

Article XI guaranteed perfect liberty of navigation and 
commerce among people of both countries under the follow- 
ing articles. This was subject to no further criticism than 
that it led up to the rest of the treaty. 

Article XII, which was to last for two years, pretended 
to regulate trade between the United States and the West 
Indies. From first to last, this article met with criticism 
and opposition. The Senate refused to ratify it, and the 
subject of the article was left over for future negotiations. 
As unsatisfactory as the article may have appeared to Jay, 
his instructions precluded him from making any commercial 
treaty which did not include the "West India trade. If no 
commercial treaty had been negotiated, then the advantages 
of the European and East India trade would have been lost. 

The British West India trade had been a source of wealth 
and power to the colonies. For that reason the Marquis 
of Buckingham suggested to Lord Grenville that the West 
India trade should be made a compensation for the reten- 
tion of the posts.** The Revolution and English legislation 
had deprived the colonies of its benefits, and they were 
anxious to accept the first opportunity to regain it. Be- 
cause of the well known exclusive terms of England's 
colonial policy. President Washington was sensible of the 
difficulties which would confront Jay. He therefore in- 
structed Jay to ask for trade in vessels of certain definite 
burdens. The limit of seventy tons was then imposed upon 
ships trading with the islands, and such a limitation was 
criticized by James Madison as a trade ' ' in canoes. ' ' Jay 's 
idea of the article was: "It breaks the ice — ^that is, it 
breaks in upon the navigation act." The limitations upon 
tonnage and ports of trade seemed to the Senate to be an 
encroachment by Great Britain upon the regulation of 
American commerce. 



** Grenville Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 611. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 31 

Article XIII provides for the trade with the British 
territories of the East Indies. This article was said to be 
worth the whole treaty, but in reality, as American mer- 
chants missed all coast trade and had to come directly to 
America with their cargoes, the benefits were decidedly lim- 
ited. Reexportation was required before full benefit could 
be derived, thus hampering our conditions more than they 
were at first. However, it was a great innovation in Eng- 
land's navigation laws and one she refused in subsequent 
negotiations.*^ 

Articles XIV and XV guarantee reciprocal commerce 
and navigation between the tFnited States and Great Brit- 
ain. There was no objection to these otherwise than the 
including of "the most favored nation" clause, which the 
French party took as a violation of their treaty with the 
United States.*® 

Article XVI relates to the appointment of consuls for 
the protection of trade. No objection. 

Article XVII allows the seizure and detention of a vessel 
with enemies' goods. Only such goods could be taken and 
the vessel allowed to proceed. This was another point at 
which the French sympathizers took particular offense. The 
United States' trade was particularly strong with France, 
and it was objected that this article legalized the right of 
search, which was working such ruin to American commer- 
cial interests. "The treaty so sanctioned a new and inad- 
missible rule of public law." 

Article XVIII enumerates the articles which are contra- 
band of war, and declares that, when provisions are so con- 
sidered, the owner shall be made speedy indemnification. 
The French party again put in strong objections, especially 
on the stipulations that provisions may be declared contra- 
band. At this time the principle that provisions could be 
treated as contraband of war was uniformly denied by the 



*^ Vide pp. 65-67. 

" Vide Part III, Section 4. 



32 JAY'S TBEATY, 

American government. It was denied by Jefferson in his 
letters*^ to Pinckney, and opposed by President Washing- 
ton.*^ It was objected to on the part of the merchants as 
including more goods in the contraband list than precedent 
had established. The reason for this obnoxious article is 
found in the unfortunate time in which the treaty was nego- 
tiated. Great Britain was involved in a war with France 
and naturally would not admit principles which would im- 
peach the propriety of her conduct in seizing provisions 
bound for that country. Jay's only remedy for it was that 
a previous article, Article VII, had secured compensation 
for seizures, and this precedent might be continued. 

Article XIX provides for the security of respective sub- 
jects and citizens from privateers and men-of-war. No 
objections. 

Article XX relates to the destruction of pirates. There 
was no objection stated. 

Article XXI stipulates that the subjects and citizens of 
the two nations should commit no acts of hostility against 
each other and should accept no commissions from foreign 
states or princes to commit hostilities. This was objected to 
by the American sympathizers with the French Eepublic. 
It prohibited them from assisting that nation in its war with 
Great Britain. The justice in the article appeared only 
when it was ascertained that such a stipulation was con- 
tained in our treaty with Holland. 

Article XXII prohibited either party from authorizing 
an act of reprisal against the other on complaint of dam- 
ages until a statement of proof had been presented to the 
party supposed to commit the injury. This article was op- 
posed by all the enemies of England who were favorable to 
the policy of sequestration and confiscation. 

Article XXIII relates to the treatment of ships, officers, 
and crews in the ports of the contracting powers. 



" Wait, State Papers, Vol. I, pp. 218, 324, 372, 408. 
*« Marshall's "Life of Washington," Vol. V, p. 619. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 33 

Article XXIV provides that the privateers of nations at 
enmity with Great Britain and the United States shall not 
arm their vessels in the ports of one for hostile purposes 
against the other, or sell what they have captured from one 
nation in the ports of the other. 

Article XXV makes it lawful for privateers or ships of 
war to take such vessels as they have captured into the 
ports of either party and be there subject to certain rights 
and privileges. No merchant vessel was to be taken within 
cannon shot of the coast or full satisfaction was guaranteed. 

Concerning the last three articles there were many ob- 
jections bearing upon the too friendly relations into which 
they led the United States with Great Britain and upon the 
facilitation of privateering. This, in the absence of a navy, 
was argued to be our only defence against Great Britain. 
After it was shown that these provisos were copies of sim- 
ilar articles in the French compact, the objections were con- 
tinued only by the radicals of the French party. 

Article XXVI. In times of war merchants and citizens 
of one country are permitted to reside in the territory of 
the other and continue their trade. No objections. 

Article XXVII provides for the return of all persons 
fleeing from justice to either country. A great cry was set 
up against this article as "a cruel stab at the sovereignty 
of the people" by those fugitives from England and Ire- 
land who, like the colonists in Australia, were outlaws for 
petty offences, such as poaching, as well as for more serious 
crimes. This article applied more particularly to murderers 
and forgers. 

Article XXVIII. The last article provides that the first 
ten shall be permanent, and the remaining articles, the 
twelfth excepted, should be limited to twelve years. No 
objections. This last article was agreed upon as an attempt 
-to overcome the weaknesses of the treaty. Jay wrote to 
Washington*^ that when the treaty had been in effect some 

*° September 3, 1795, State Papers, Foreign Kelations, Vol. I. Cf. 
Jay 's * ' Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, ' ' Vol. II. 



34 JAY'S TREATY, 

time defects would appear and further arrangements would 
be necessary. This article would make allowances for the 
settlement of questions on impressment and the contraband 
character of various goods. 

In order to form a just estimate of the treaty with Great 
Britain, the political state of Europe and America must be 
kept in mind.^** Any treaty with England, it was obvious, 
could be negotiated only at a great disadvantage, but it was 
unquestionably worth the trial. 

In general, those complaints which were directed against 
the treaty were most bitter upon what the treaty did not 
contain rather than on the articles it did. 

The stipulations it did not contain were those upon 
which the negotiators could not agree, and have been pre- 
viously discussed.^^ The omission of an article forbidding 
impressment brought down the opposition of the merchant 
class. The lack of a compensation for negroes raised a 
strong party unfavorable to the treaty in the south. The 
jealous stipulations for West India trade were opposed by 
the commercial class and finally left unratified. The recog- 
nition of a right of search was also a point against the 
interests of the above parties. But the rights of search and 
the impressment of American seamen were not questions of 
diplomacy; their answer was found in the War of 1812. 
The War of 1812 failed to eliminate impressment entirely. 
Mr. Webster's emphatic letter to Lord Ashburton alone 
removed that disturbing element. It was not until October, 
1830, that the gates of the British West India trade were 
opened to American vessels. 

The main weaknesses were summed up by the party in 
opposition in Congress. The treaty, as a whole, did not 
prohibit interference in our international relations, but 
fixed a foundation for further British influence. It re- 
stricted some of the most important rights of international 



'" Vide Introduction. 

" Ante Part II, Section 2. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 35 

sovereignty and hazarded the neutrality of the United 
States- The whole treaty was unequal and unjust in rela- 
tion to the spirit of the treaty of 1783. 

Popularly, it was argued that Jay was a timid negoti- 
ator, and his unfriendly feeling for France and sympathy 
for Great Britain had led him into a betrayal of his coun- 
try's interests. 

A defence of the treaty upon principle would undoubt- 
edly be very weak, whatever might be said upon the score 
of policy. The dictatorial attitude of England is quite ap- 
parent and the commercial interests are decidedly in favor 
of that nation. Lyman states that "as a mere trial of diplo- 
matic skill this treaty is a confessed failure, for with a soli- 
tary exception, the tardy evacuation of the posts, its ratifi- 
cation abandoned every position which the government had 
assumed in preliminary discussions and its formal diplo- 
matic instructions." But this criticism will be found to 
overreach a true estimation of conditions. Jay was com- 
pelled to accept or reject whatever the British negotiator 
had to offer, and there is very probably nothing in the regu- 
lation of the national interests which will excite any pride 
in the American people. However, there was no small 
amount of diplomacy. The first success came in obtaining 
any recognition whatever from Great Britain. The second 
step was not so much concerned with reciprocal relations — 
offering valuable concessions for valuable concessions — for 
the United States had nothing of such vital importance to 
offer Great Britain but what that country was able to take 
for herself. The diplomacy lay in drawing from England 
the greatest concessions which she would possibly admit. 
Mr. Pinckney, the minister to England during this period 
of negotiation, may be considered as a very competent judge 
of the result. "As little has been conceded by Mr. Jay and 
as much obtained by the United States as, all the circum- 
stances considered, could be expected. "^^ It was never 

°^ Correspondence on the Treaty, American State Papers, Foreign 
Eelations, Vol. I. 



36 JAY'S TBEATY, 

maintained by the most ardent supporters of the treaty that 
it was without faults, but rather that these weaknesses were 
due to the inequality in the commercial power of the two 
nations. Jay's judgment is judicially characteristic and 
very fair in this regard. "My opinion of the treaty is ap- 
parent from my having signed it. I have no reason to be- 
lieve or conjecture that one more favorable to us is obtain- 
able.°^ He also recognized that many questions were yet 
unsettled. "Perhaps it is not so much to be regretted that 
all our differences are merged in this treaty without having 
been decided." Possession is proverbially nine points of 
the law, and what England surrendered was virtually her 
own even to the possession of the military posts. The Amer- 
ican flag waved over the ocean by her suffrance alone. In 
later years its right to wave there could be and was amply 
proved. 

A modern criticism holds that Jay's treaty is "as great 
an American diplomatic victory as was the wringing from 
the Dutch Republic the recognition of American independ- 
ence. "^* Certainly no treaty ever negotiated by America 
has been so heartily condemned or has obtained more bene- 
fits in comparison with its unpopularity. The benefits will 
be more thoroughly discussed later. A summary will, how- 
ever, be proper here. The treaty prevented an inopportune 
war; obviated the necessity of a closer allegiance with 
France; fixed neutrality as a settled policy in a contest 
which was to involve every nation in Europe; time was 
allowed for the American union to become more strong and 
the government to run smoothly; over two million dollars 
were granted to American merchants who had suffered dur- 
ing hostilities, and Great Britain here acknowledged the in- 
justice of her proceedings and waived the attempt to inject 
the rule of 1756 into international law; the military posts 
were given up at the appointed time, which was more than 
the treaty of 1783 could secure ; and for the first time in 

^ American State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I, November 19, 
1794. ride Appendix A (3). 

" Annual Eeport of the American Historical Association, 1898. 



OE THE THE AT Y OF 1794. 37 

American history a provision was made for the extradition 
of criminals. A comparison with later negotiations showed 
that many stipulations of this "execrable" treaty of 1794 
were adopted in later compacts. 

But in addition to all these benefits, there is a niggardly 
justification of the treaty in the fact that it was an alterna- 
tive for war. There was a haughty indifference on the part 
of Great Britain to the unsettled problems which vexed the 
United States. There was a desire to injure American in- 
terests, to neglect American remonstrances, and provoke 
delays for settlement which raised popular feeling so 
strongly against Great Britain that it insured hostilities. 
In the face of French sympathies, such feeling could not 
long be suppressed. Contemporary statesmen say that the 
United States, in case of war, could barely have sustained 
honor and existence. ^^ At least, war would have injured 
American commerce, excited strong sectional discontent, 
checked the spirit of commercial and maritime enterprise 
and strengthened rather than removed the cause of ill- 
feeling between the two nations. 

As a matter of fact, the treaty worked more good in 
practice than was believed possible even by its advocates. 
"Washington debated its ratification long and seriously, but 
later declared : ' ' The treaty has secured everything desir- 
able in respect to our foreign relations, toward confirming 
their prosperity."^® 

4. A discussion of the treaty has been given at this 
point that there might be a better understanding of the 
problems which were presented at the time of its ratification. 

The contract resulting from Jay's mission was handed 
to the Secretary of State, Edmond Randolph, upon the 7th 
of March, 1795, and was transmitted to the Senate in special 
session on June 8 of the same year. Its ratification was 
advised by that body upon June 24. Nothing concerning 

^^ Lyman, ' ' Diplomacy of the United States, " p. 127. 
^^ Farewell address, September 17, 1796. Eiehardson, ' ' A Compila- 
tion of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. I. 



38 JAY'S TBEATY, 

the treaty was definitely known until its publication in tlie 
American Daily Advertiser on July 2. But various conjec- 
tures were made, and these untrue conjectures were really 
the cause of much poorly reasoned and premature oppo- 
sition. 

James Madison was in a position to learn as much of the 
treaty as easily as any one. On November 30, 1794, he 
writes : ' ' All that is given out from Jay 's negotiations is 
in favor of some advantageous results. "^'^ It was not until 
March 22, 1795, that he was able to write with any assur- 
ance upon the contents of the treaty. From that date, 
letters and early criticism spread a general and, for the 
most part, an unfavorable knowledge of the treaty. Ac- 
cordingly, when it came before the Senate for discussion 
every influence was brought to bear upon that seclusive 
body. 

The Senate met and immediately passed a motion that 
all work upon the treaty should be done behind closed 
doors. Therefore, no record is left of the proceedings of the 
Senate upon this document. This policy provoked no small 
amount of criticism, and every effort was made by the party 
in opposition to induce or intimidate the Senate into public 
debates. One of the contemporary republican writers 
states: "The conduct of the Senate respecting the treaty 
is truly extraordinary. Upon what constitutionality or re- 
publican principle they can justify secrecy, in relation to 
a law, which shall rival the darkness of a conclave or a 
seraglio, is extremely difficult to conceive." All this was 
for the very apparent purpose of publishing the inflamma- 
tory speeches of the opposition. 

During the process of debate. Burr of Virginia proposed 
that all considerations of the treaty be postponed; other 
Senators proposed that a part should be accepted, a part 
revised, and the rest of it expunged ; still others moved that 



^^ Writings of James Madison, Vol. II, Letters to Thomas Jef- 
ferson. 



OR TEE TREATY OF 1794. 39 

the President be advised to negotiate further. Senator 
Tazewell finally moved that the treaty "be not signed." 
The motion was voted down, and the Senate by a strict 
party vote recommended the President to attach his signa- 
ture. The vote as it finally stood was an exact two-thirds 
majority, which is necessary for a constitutional ratification 
of a treaty. The vote stood twenty yeas and ten nays. The 
ratification was conditional. It suspended that part of the 
twelfth article^^ which related to West India trade, the 
principal objection being that it prohibited the exportation 
of certain products — sugar, molasses, cocoa, coffee, and 
cotton. In its place the Senate suggested another article. 

The discussion of the treaty in the Senate was probably 
very thorough. Thirty-three copies of the treaty were 
printed under an oath of secrecy and these distributed 
among the Senators for individual study. The Senate was 
not satisfied with the document under debate. In the for- 
mal notice to the President, recommending his signature, it 
was added : ' ' And the Senate recommend to the President 
to proceed without delay to further friendly negotiations 
with His Majesty on the subject of said trade, and of the 
terms and conditions in question." 

This peculiar ratification of the Senate placed the Presi- 
dent in an unprecedented position. In the provisional 
order of that body, he was asked to ratify an article which 
had never been laid before the Senate, and in all events he 
was advised to ratify a treaty not agreed upon by the Eng- 
lish negotiator. The President believed that the proceedings 
of the Senate fell clearly within the meaning of the Consti- 
tution,^^ and after favorable advice from his Cabinet and a 

^' By the suspension of this article and the ratification by the Brit- 
ish Parliament with this amendment, a precedent was established of 
ratifying treaties with the exception of one or more articles. When 
Monroe and Pinckney were negotiating in London on June 3, 1804, 
Lord Hawkesbury censured the practice of ratifying parts of a treaty 
as "new, unauthorized, and not to be sanctioned." The treaty of 
1794 was brought up as a precedent. State Papers, Foreign Eelations, 
Vol. Ill, p. 93. Cf. "Porcupine Works," Vol. II, p. 271. 

^^ Article II, Section 2, paragraph 2. 



40 JAY'S TREATY, 

"full and mature deliberation," he attached his signature. 
He hesitated in his action but once, when it was reported 
that the British Council had given orders to seize all pro- 
vision ships. The report was unofficial and false. 

The treaty was subjected to a long debate in the cabinet, 
with the result that, excepting one member,''^ all concurred 
in its ratification. Through all the tumult which popular 
discussion of the treaty caused and in spite of the attempts 
to intimidate the President into rejecting it, Washington re- 
mained calm and collected. He gave the treaty deliberate 
and unbiased consideration, he believed a better one could 
not at the time be obtained and signed it : " although it does 
not rise to our wishes, yet it appears to me calculated to pro- 
cure to the United States such advantages as entitle it to 
our acceptance.""^ 

As Mr. Jay had rfeturned to America and Mr. Pinckney 
was absent in Madrid upon a special mission, ratifications 
were exchanged on the 28th of October, 1795, between Lord 
Grenville and William Allen Deas, the Secretary of the 
United States Legation. The British government made no 
objection to the suspension of the twelfth article. 

On the 1st of March, 1796, the President communicated 
to Congress for their information and vote, the necessary 
appropriation to put it into effect. Upon March 2, Edward 
Livingston of New York made a motion requesting the 
President to lay before the House all papers relating to 
Jay's treaty. The Republicans favored this attitude, and 
as they were in the majority the motion carried by a vote 
of sixty-two against thirty-seven after a debate lasting from 
March 7 to the 24th. The instructions to Jay had been 
published and were generally known, but Washington, after 

^ Secretary of State Eandolph. Vide Eandolph 's ' ' Vindication of 
Eandolph's Eesignation. " He claimed the British right of search 
and impressment was conceded by America, and therefore probably re- 
vealed enough of the treaty to cause opposition. Lyman, ' ' The Diplo- 
macy of the United States." 

*" A letter of Washington. Eeports of the American Historical As- 
sociation, 1901, Vol. I. 



OB TEE TREATY OF 1794. 41 

consulting his cabinet, refused®^ to grant the request of the 
House. The grounds for his refusal were : The dangerous 
precedent which would be established in that the disclosure 
of foreign affairs was often impolitic, and that dangerous 
results might be expected by allowing the House any voice 
in the powers of treaty making. Such procedure on the part 
of the House was not provided for in the constitution and 
was contrary to the purpose of the Constitutional Conven- 
tion, which had upheld the principle of equal representation 
in international relations. 

The House considered "Washington 's reply and the right 
to demand the papers was reaffirmed. By some it was main- 
tained that the House was vested with discretionary powers 
to carry a treaty into effect or to refuse to do so by failure to 
vote necessary supplies. By the other party it was claimed 
that the treaty -making power was vested exclusively in the 
President and the Senate, that the House must acquiesce in 
their decision and vote the necessary funds to put the com- 
pact into execution. 

The debate was not so much upon the treaty-making 
right of the House as their right to refuse appropriations to 
carry the treaty into effect. This is shown by the motion 
passed upon April 7, which declared, first, that the House 
had no claim as an agent in making treaties, but, second, as 
a part of Congress it had a right to deliberate on any treaty 
carrying into effect regulations on subjects given by the 
constitution to the control of Congress. The other argu- 
ment was that the Constitution had purposely excluded the 
House from all participation in the making of treaties. 
This came from the Federalists, or Strict Constructionists, 
and many of its members had participated in the Constitu- 
tional Convention. 

From this point, the debate drifted into the merits and 
faults of Jay's treaty, and on April 15 the debate centered 
upon a federalist resolution to put the treaty into effect. 

«== March 30, 1796. State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I, p. 550. 



42 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

There were two great questions constantly before the House : 
First, the constitutionality of their discretionary power in 
voting appropriations for a treaty; second, the question of 
voting an appropriation to put the treaty into effect. De- 
bates upon these questions occupied the entire attention of 
Congress. 

James Madison was leader of the opposition and spoke 
very strongly against voting ninety thousand dollars of the 
people's money, not counting the British debts which were 
involved, to put a treaty so unfavorable into effect. This 
same argument has been used in every acquisition of terri- 
tory by the United States : in the Louisiana treaty of 1803, 
the Gadsden purchase of 1854, and the Alaskan purchase 
of 1867. Twenty million dollars have since been paid for a 
group of islands. Madison also argued that the treasury 
was empty, and the only resource was borrowing, which was 
extremely difficult at the time. The commercial disadvan- 
tages were dwelt upon, and in fact all the objections which 
have been previously mentioned were urged in the most 
emphatic manner possible. 

The Connecticut representatives, Mr. Swift and more 
especially Mr. Hillhouse, made the strongest speeches in 
favor of voting the necessary appropriation. They dwelt 
particularly upon the lack of foundation for the results the 
opposition had predicted in case the treaty was adopted and 
spoke at length on the unsettled conditions which would 
exist and the war which would arise if the compact was not 
adopted. 

On April 29 the question of voting the appropriation 
came before the House as a Committee of the Whole. The 
vote cast was forty-nine to forty-nine, but the speaker, 
though opposing, voted for the treaty to give further oppor- 
tunity to consider it. 

This vote on the part of the speaker, Mr. Jonathan 
Dayton, of New Jersey, is one of tremendous importance. 
With perfect honor on his part he could have voted against 



OE THE TBEATY OF 1794. 43 

the treaty, caused a deadlock in Congress, refused the means 
of executing that contract, put the United States govern- 
ment in a very embarrassing position with Great Britain 
and wrought disastrous results on the treaty making power 
of the President and Senate. As it was, the two main influ- 
ences which promoted the success of the treaty were allowed 
to operate. By prolonging the discussion in Congress an 
opportunity was given to allow the mercantile and conserv- 
ative voice of the country to be heard. Furthermore, the 
necessary time was given for the reaction which must in- 
evitably follow such an outburst of popular feeling. The 
second influence declaring for the treaty was the speech of 
Fisher Ames, the Representative from Massachusetts. Mr. 
Ames was a member of Congress during the administration 
of Washington. He was an ardent Federalist and one of 
the leaders of the House, where he was considered an 
extemporaneous but finished orator of great persuasive 
power. This speech was the culmination of his official 
career. He had been very ill during the entire session of 
Congress and a few days previous was thought to be on his 
death-bed. The permission for a further discussion came at 
a time when he was able to reach the House, and after Mr. 
Preston had spoken, he staggered from his seat and ad- 
dressed the chair, saying he hoped his strength would permit 
him to speak for a few moments. He spoke without pre- 
meditation, compelled by his feelings and his knowledge of 
human motives and political action. His emaciated form 
and the pallor of death upon his face enlisted unbounded 
sympathy, and tradition had it for many years that Ames' 
speech on the British treaty was the most powerful ever 
delivered in Congress. Be that as it may, the speech in 
junction with the other factors mentioned secured a ma- 
jority in favor of the treaty. The perplexing problem 
which was presented was deferred for a more mature gov- 
ernment and wider experience to solve. The result of the 
conflict had shown a difficulty in the practical working of 
the Constitution, which still remains unremedied. 



44 JAY'S TEEATY, 

The three different ballots taken upon the treaty proved 
a very close division of opinion. The first was : For a 
motion declaring the treaty objectionable, forty-eight; 
against such a declaration, forty-eight, with the vote of the 
Speaker. The second vote stood : For declaring the treaty 
objectionable, forty-nine ; against such a declaration, forty- 
nine. The Speaker voted with the negative. Some declared 
for the treaty because they did not believe it objectionable, 
others because they feared a contrary declaration was inju- 
rious, and still others supported the treaty because to object 
to it was to object to all compromise. The final ballot came 
upon a motion by Mr. Hillhouse of Connecticut, to carry 
the treaty into effect. It was supported by fifty-one mem- 
bers because they believed the treaty a good one, or the best 
under the circumstances. Forty-eight members opposed the 
treaty as a bad one. Five members were absent. The treaty 
was safe. The interests which passed it were : The support 
of Washington, the insignificance of the sum for the appro- 
priation, and the work of the conservative element. The 
defeated party was the Democratic party, jealous of the 
powers of Congress to control the public purse. 

The debates in Congress were long and followed out 
every possible line of argument. Concerning them. Chief 
Justice Marshall said : ' ' Never had a greater display been 
made of argument, of eloquence, of passion.'"'^ Washing- 
ton notes that "it (the treaty) suspended in a manner all 
other business ' ' of the House and ' ' agitated the public mind 
in a higher degree than it has been at any period since the 
Revolution. ' ' 

When the House, by so frail a majority, voted to support 
the treaty, it was taken up in public meetings, discussed in 
the newspapers, and even condemned or approved in the 
State Legislatures. 

People all over the United States took up the debate 
either for or against such a relation with Great Britain, and 

•^Annals of Congress, Fourth Congress, first session. Editorial 
note. 



OE TEE TEE AT Y OF 1794. 45 

the work of the opposition is a blot upon the fair adminis- 
tration of "Washington. 

Randolph, as Secretary of State, was one of the few who 
became acquainted with the treaty upon its arrival in 
America, and he has been accused of giving out unfavor- 
able articles of the compact to which he was so much op- 
posed. This was done in May, 1795, for the purpose of 
forming a hostile sentiment. There is evidence supporting 
such a statement in the fact that the condemnation of the 
treaty spread much faster than any accurate knowledge of 
its contents. Opposition really began with the appointment 
of Jay, which was declared unconstitutional. Legislative 
measures with a purpose to destroy any fruits which might 
result from Jay's mission have already been noted.*'* 

But the final burst of indignation came after the mis- 
conduct of Senator Mason in the publication of the treaty 
on July 2, 1795. Thomas Jefferson voiced the Republican 
sentiments when he called the incident "a bold act of duty 
in one of our Senators. "^^ He called the treaty an "exe- 
crable," "an infamous act" which was "nothing more than 
a treaty of alliance between England and the Anglo-men of 
this country against the legislature and people of the United 
States." The publication precipitated a storm of abuse. 
The waves of party feeling ran high, and were agitated still 
further by demagogues and mob orators. Public meetings 
denounced the treaty on every side. Copies of it were 
burned before many of the homes of British officials, north 
and south. Jay was dragged through the streets in e^^j 
and guillotined.^** He was pictured as selling for British 
gold the interests of his country. Language far beyond 
what is fit for publication was used to characterize his act. 
In banquets which were in any way concerned with interna- 
tional interests, toasts in the form of puns upon his name 

•^ Supra Part I, Section 2 ; Part II, Section 1. 

•=' American Historical Eeports, 1901, Vol. I, p. 287. 

*® Appendix C. 



46 JAY'S TBEATY, 

were strictly in order.®'' The political newspapers of Cor- 
bett, Freneau, Fermo, and Bache reveled in malignancy and 
abuse. Some of the most venomous articles were in the 
Aurora, and written by John Beckley, who signed himself 
"A Calm Observer." At Boston, in June, 1795, a publica- 
tion invited all Americans who felt ''the spirit of resent- 
ment and revenge" to assist in burning a Bermudan pri- 
vateer.®^ This action was taken at the instigation of the 
French consul at that port. The vessel, properly called the 
' ' Speedwell, ' ' was sailing under the name of the ' ' Bettsy of 
St. Croix" to deceive the privateers of the Bermudas. She 
was dismantled and burned to the water's edge. The papers 
later characterized the deed as one which could "hardly be 
justified. ' ' 

From Boston messengers riding night and day carried 
the news to New York. For days the probable downfall of 
the treaty had been discussed on every street corner. When 
the news came from Boston, the citizens of New York felt 
that such action was worthy of all imitation, and soon after 
stoned Hamilton in his attempt to defend the treaty. The 
proceedings in Philadelphia have already been suggested. 
Virginia very strongly declared its intentions of withdraw- 
ing from the union. 

In Charleston the hangman was chief official in burning 
the treaty in the public square, while the British flag was 
dragged through the streets. South Carolina was particu- 
larly strong in declaring its "abhorrence and detestation of 
a treaty which gave the English government more power 
over us as states than it claimed over us as colonies — a 
treaty involving in it pusillanimity, stupidity, ingratitude, 
and treachery. ' ' It claimed that the Senators who had ad- 
vocated the treaty were unworthy any further trust, and 

" " A perpetual harvest to America ; but dipt wings, lame legs, the 
pip, and an empty crop to all Jays. ' ' — Aurora, July 7, 1795. 

"The Eepublic of America: May she never mistake Jaybirds for 
Eagles. ' ' — Courier Frangaise, July 15, 1795. 

^Cf. McMaster's "History of the United States," Vol. II, p. 217. 
Also, Hildreth's "History of the United States," Vols. IV, V. 



OIL TEE TREATY OF 1794. 47 

their six-year term was dangerous to American liberty un- 
less the constitution should be amended. 

When the treaty was ready for the President's signa- 
ture, the cry went up : This was the test ' ' whether the 
majesty of the people was like the children's rattle," or a 
power in absolute and real existence. When the President 
concurred in the Senate's action, the House of Delegates in 
Virginia voted down a resolution declaring their undimin- 
ished confidence in the President. He was accused of usurp- 
ing the powers of Congress. From all quarters he had 
received personal letters with a purpose to influence him 
against the ratification. These continued to arrive from 
outside districts until the late spring of 1796. The Presi- 
dent's conduct was subject to severe criticism by Franklin''^ 
in that his nomination of Jay was unconstitutional. But 
there is nothing in the Constitution to prohibit it. The 
President was becoming "monarchial" in appointing a 
man so opposed by the House of Representatives. But such 
a statement is totally unauthorized by any facts. The nomi- 
nation of Jay had never been put to a vote in the House, 

It is not to be wondered at, that this spirit of opposition 
found its way into the halls of Congress and caused long 
and eloquent discussions. With the exception of the Civil 
War times, never has public opinion, since the founding of 
the nation, been so decided and demonstrative. Through- 
out the summer, fall, and winter of 1795 and the spring of 
1796, the country was flooded with pamphlets, anonymous 
letters and circulars. Out of the vast amount of literature 
which resulted, that of Alexander Hamilton, as ' ' Camillus, ' ' 
is in defense of the treaty and far superior to any other 
writings for either side upon the subject. The work of Ed- 
ward Livingston, Secretary of the Treasury, as ' ' Decius, ' ' is 
the best in behalf of the opposition. 

Much of the hostility to the treaty had no cause but the 
riotous agitations of demagogues and their contagious ef- 

"» ' ' Porcupine Works, ' ' Vol. II. 



48 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

fects. The objections of the more serious thinkers can be 
classed under the supposed wrongs which the treaty would 
inflict upon the American carrying trade, its disregard of 
the French treaty, the lack of compensation for negroes, 
retention of forts, and commercial depredations, and the 
" unjust principles supposed to be involved in its interna- 
tional law stipulations. Most of these reasons have been 
considered; the rest will be left for separate explanation 
under the effects of the treaty. 

The object of all this violence was to intimidate the 
President and bring popular feeling to bear in the House 
against the ratification of the treaty. 

The character of the factions which opposed the treaty 
explains in itself the reason for their hostility. They were 
composed of those southerners who had not been compen- 
sated for their slaves and who were debtors to the British 
and hoped to escape those debts by their confiscation in war ; 
of the French party, because American dependence on their 
commerce as well as their political influence had been less- 
ened, also the relations of this government were upon 
friendly terms with their enemy; of anti-federalists, be- 
cause they were disarmed of an effective complaint against 
the government in the retention of the military posts and 
the spoliations of commerce; of the Jacobin philosophers, 
and especially those societies in New York whose doctrines 
were made up of all the schemes which would conflict with 
the existing governmental policy ;'^° of the disorganized poli- 
ticians who had inbibed the spirit of opposition upon the 
street corners and mass meetings; of those malcontents of 
various descriptions who loved spoils of war and who fol- 
lowed their leaders without personal reason or foresight; 
and lastly of those English and Irish emigrants who had 
fled from justice in their own country and feared punish- 
ment of a serious or petty nature if returned. 

Jay knew the treaty would never become popular be- 
cause of its unsettled interests. He writes: "I knew and 



'" Two of their publications were The JacoMniad and The Guillotina. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 49 

know that no attainable settlement or treaty would give 
universal satisfaction and expect the one I have signed will 
administer occasion for calumny and detraction. * * * 
Demagogues will constantly flatter the passions and preju- 
dices of the multitude and will never cease to employ im- 
proper arts against those who will not be their instru- 
ments. ' '^^ 

Slowly but surely the tide of popular feeling began to 
turn, not in favor of the treaty, for it bore the indelible 
stamp of unpopularity. The course of popular feeling 
turned in favor of Washington, who controlled the nation 
with that calm dignity, moral independence, conscious recti- 
tude, beautiful consistency and simplicity of purpose which 
idealizes him in the hearts of his countrymen. It was only 
the rancor of political parties which libeled this man who 
had resisted the encroachments of England on a weak and 
dependent country. Spain had retired before his unflinch- 
ing purpose and every nation in Europe felt the influence 
of this career marked with probity and steady devotion to 
the interests of the United States. Jay found the confidence 
placed in Washington of use in his negotiations.'^^ Madison 
found the name of the President working ''wonderful suc- 
cess" in favor of the treaty of America.'^^ "Washington's 
personal authority more than anything else carried the 
treaty and averted war with Great Britain."^* By his 
ratification of Jay's work he demonstrated to the world the 
power of the government which had recently been estab- 
lished. The United States was no longer known abroad as 
the weak decentralized power existing under the Articles of 
Confederation, but for the first time it was placed de jure 
where it had been considered de facto. Its power as a 
treaty-making nation was established, and its position con- 

^^ Johnston 's ' ' Life and Correspondence of John Jay, ' ' Vol. IV. 
Letter to President Washington, February 25, 1795. 

'"^ Ibid., Letter to Washington, November 19, 1794. 

""Writings of James Madison." Letter to Ed. Pendleton, Feb- 
ruary 7, 1796. 

'* Fiske 's ' * Essays, Historical and Literary, ' ' Vol. II, p. 135, 



50 JAY'S TREATY, 

firmed among the family of sovereign nations. The greatest 
benefit of Washington 's administration is that in this polit- 
ical crisis it was wise enough to recognize and firm enough 
to accept a national necessity. To him and to his assistants 
it was given to create strength from their weakness, and to 
develop a noble pride from a wise humility. No Presiden- 
tial policy could be more simply and truly outlined than in 
Washington 's reply to the letter of the Selectmen of Boston, 
July 28, 1795, answering their questions regarding the 
treaty-making power under the Constitution. This letter,'^^ 
coming at the time of great political passion and contention, 
quieted the factions among the people of the north and reas- 
oned the opposition into support. 

Concerning the arguments in the Senate, only conjec- 
tures can be drawn. It is quite apparent the debates for 
the adoption of the treaty were convincing. These two 
branches of the government were sufficient to declare the 



'° Gentlemen : In every act of my administration I have sought 
the happiness of my fellow citizens. My system for the attainment of 
this object has uniformly been to overlook all personal, local, and 
partial considerations; to contemplate the United States as one great 
whole ; to confide that sudden impressions, when erroneous, would yield 
to candid reflection ; and to consult only the substantial and permanent 
interests of our country. Nor have I departed from this line of con- 
duct on the occasion which has produced the resolutions contained in 
your letter of the 13th instant. 

Without a predilection for my own judgment, I have weighed with 
attention every argument which has at any time been brought into 
view; but the Constitution is the guide I never can abandon. It has 
assigned to the President the power of making treaties, with the ad- 
vice and consent of the Senate. It was doubtless supposed that these 
two branches of government would combine without passion, and with 
the best means of information, those facts and principles upon which 
the success of our foreign relations depend; that they ought not to 
substitute for their own connections the opinion of others, or to seek 
truth through any channel but that of temperate and well formed in- 
vestigation. 

Under this persuasion I have resolved on the manner of executing 
the duty before me. To the high responsibility attached to it I freely 
submit; and you, gentlemen, are at liberty to make these sentiments 
known, as the grounds of my procedure. While I feel the most lively 
gratitude for the many instances of approbation from my country, I 
cannot otherwise deserve it than by obeying the dictates of my con- 
science. With due respect, I am, gentlemen, your obedient, 

George Washington. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 51 

treaty in force. But the lower house of Congress and the 
people were to be satisfied. The work of Fisher Ames won 
the necessary support from the former and the unequaled 
efforts of Alexander Hamilton won conviction from the con- 
servative elements of the people. Regarding the military 
posts, the commercial and negro questions, he argued better 
than Jay himself. By sound reasoning in behalf of the 
treaty and ridicule for the opposition he gained the support 
of those who might have fallen into the popular channels. 
Those who endeavored to reply to his essays were soon 
silenced or found their arguments too weak to gain the 
needed support. These essays came out under the name 
"Camillus, " and their sole purpose was to reconcile the 
people to the action of the administration. Hamilton had 
done all in his power to stem the tide of popular opposition. 
The success of his work was shown as the summer of 1795 
went by. Jefferson spoke of him as "really a colossus to 
the anti-republican party" and "without numbers, a host 
within himself. ' ' 

Many of the states which had previously opposed the 
treaty so violently now suffered a reaction. In the latter 
part of the year 1795 most of them had sent resolutions in 
favor of the treaty to Washington. By March 15, 1796, 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina 
had declared themselves favorable to its execution. South 
Carolina believed the treaty to be injurious, Kentucky 
called it unconstitutional, and Virginia declared for ex- 
treme opposition. The party which had been won over 
entertained the belief which Gouverneur Morris expressed : 
"That more noise was made about it than was proper, owing 
to personal causes. ' '^^ 

5. On the other hand, no such criticism is applicable to 
the history of the treaty in Great Britain. The English 

" ' ' Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris. ' ' Entry for Auffust 
22, 1795. 



52 JAY'S TREATY, 

Parliament was primarily concerned with its war against 
France and the affairs upon the continent. It gave a small 
amount of attention to the treaty which Gren-ville and the 
American minister were negotiating. It was satisfied with 
Grenville 's meager report, and the treaty itself was allowed 
to speak as a result of the negotiations. 

Opposition to the treaty was very slight. However, the 
faults of the treaty were readily recognized. Charles Fox, 
in his speech before the British Parliament, made objections 
to the same articles which the patriots of, this country had 
made. One objection was that "the article restricting the 
trade of the United States with the British West Indies to 
vessels not exceeding seventy tons was equivalent to an act 
for creating a nursery of seamen for America. ' ' Small ves- 
sels required, in proportion to their tonnage, an additional 
force of seamen, averaging between thirty-four and thirty- 
eight more men for vessels of forty tons than vessels of four 
hundred tons.'^^ The most serious objection which appears 
was raised in the Irish Parliament by Mr. Gratan : ' ' This 
very America which the British minister insulted and then 
crouched to had, by the late Treaty of Commerce, been ad- 
mitted to all the British settlements in the East and West 
Indies, to the latter of which Ireland was only conditionally 
admitted, and from the former unconditionally excluded; 
yet Ireland was a loyal, attached nation, and America, an 
alien. ' '' * 

The attitude of the British Parliament is one of self- 
censure. Mr. Fox, in his report for the Committee on the 
State of the Nation, says: "With respect to America, 
* * * after giving orders for taking her goods, we re- 
called those orders and have since entered into a treaty by 
which we agree, properly, I believe, justly, and if justly, 
wisely, to pay for the rashness and folly of issuing them. ' ''^® 

" Annals of Congress, Fourth Congress, third session, p. 32. 
''^ Benton 's ' ' Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, ' ' Vol. I, 
p. 718. 

'" Hansard's "Parliamentary Debates," Vol. 31, p. 1368. 



OR THE TREATY OF 1794. 53 

Grenville, in regard to the negotiations, states that "he 
could hardly with propriety speak of a treaty which, though 
signed, was not yet ratified. When that was done, he 
undertook for himself and colleagues to show that it was 
fraught with mutual honor and advantage to both countries, 
and he declared that he should always consider the conduct 
of the gentleman who carried on the negotiations on the 
part of America as highly honorable to them, marked as it 
was by temper, moderation, and good sense." The Mar- 
quis of Lansdown said the treatment of the sister people of 
America was marked with more than common outrage, espe- 
cially in regard to their orders upon American commerce, 
the subtle means they had employed in causing the Alge- 
rians to declare against America, and by inciting the Indian 
tribes against them. "No power on earth could display 
more true wisdom, more dignified moderation, than had Mr. 
Washington and the government of America. ' '^^ On July 4, 
1797, Parliament passed an act of twenty-seven long articles 
which put the treaty into effect. 

Great Britain returned the compact on the 1st of Feb- 
ruary, 1796, and in the latter part of that month President 
Washington issued his proclamation requiring its observ- 
ance by all persons. Jay wrote to Grenville : ' ' The treaty 
will go into operation and supported by a majority of the 
people, a majority comprising the greater part of the men 
most distinguished by talent, weight, and worth. ' '^^ 

III.— EESULTS OF THE TREATY. 

By the proclamation of Washington, requiring the ob- 
servance of the articles in the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, 
and Navigation, the periods of negotiation and ratification 
of the treaty proper are finished. Yet there remains a solu- 
tion to all the problems which were viewed with deep con- 

^^ Hansard's "Parliamentary Debates," Vol. 30, p. 1401. 
^^ Johnston's "Life and Correspondence of John Jay," Vol. II. 
Letter dated May 1, 1796, 



54 JAY'S TREATY, 

cern by the opponents of the treaty and optimistically 
interpreted by its advocates. 

1. The period for the evacuation of the forts, which 
had been so strongly condemned, was sought by Great Brit- 
ain to insure herself from any breach of the treaty by a 
government which she did not as yet understand. These 
ports^^ were evacuated and all arrangements regarding them 
concluded by December, 1796. Some of them, Detroit and 
Oswego in particular, became points of more than local 
interest. Others were used as trading posts and forts from 
which the conduct and temper of the Indians could be in- 
fluenced. The rest have crumbled into decay and oblivion. 

Before appropriations to put the treaty into effect had 
been voted by Congress, an article^^ explanatory of the 
third article of the treaty, and regulating the passage of 
Indians from one territory to the other, had been concluded, 
May 4, 1796. 

Articles IV and V related to the settlement of the 
northwestern and northeastern boundary lines. The exact 
location of both boundaries has been subject to much nego- 
tiation. A convention was drawn up in London, May 12, 
1803, and attempted to settle the questions. The project 
was submitted to the Senate upon October 24 of the same 
year, and it was ratified with the exception of the fifth 
article. This declared that the boundary line of the north- 
west should be the shortest line drawn from the source of 
the Mississippi River to the northwest point of the Lake of 
the Woods. Ratifications were never exchanged, although 
this boundary line is taken on all maps of the United States 
during this uncertain period. The commission under the 
fourth article accomplished nothing. It was left for the 
purchase of Louisiana in 1803 and the Webster- Ashburton 
treaty of 1842 to carry the boundary line to the Rocky 
Mountains, and to the settlement of 1846 to fix the boun- 
dary to the Pacific coast. 

'^ Appendix E : Consideration and Map. 
^ Appendix B : Explanatory Articles. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 55 

The commission under the fifth article, to determine the 
northeast boundary line, met at St. Andrews in Passama- 
quoddy Bay during the early part of October, 1796. The 
survey was started, but it required more time than had been 
expected, and they adjourned to meet at Boston in August, 
1797. A difficulty was experienced in locating the river 
St. Croix, as required in the treaty, and in March, 1798, an 
explanatory article was agreed upon, authorizing the com- 
missions to designate the source of the river in any manner 
which they saw fit. The survey had not been completed 
when the time for a meeting had arrived, so they met at 
Providence, Khode Island, in June of the following year. 
Their decision was made on the 25th of October and given 
to Congress in the address of President Adams. 

The report, as given by the commission, was a compro- 
mise. Undoubtedly the river intended to be the St. Croix 
by the peace commissioners of 1783 was the most easterly 
river, or the Magadavy. This was the testimony of the 
commissioners Adams, Jay, and Franklin. It is equally 
certain that the river accepted as the St. Croix was the one 
so named in the traditions and treaties of two centuries. 
England succeeded in acquiring several square miles of 
territory by her usual method of adhering to the letter of 
the treaty rather than its spirit. The identity of the St. 
Croix was fixed and its source and mouth determined. Here 
the commissioners' work was ended, leaving two sections of 
disputed boundary at both ends of the river. 

A question soon arose as to what part of the country was 
intended by "the highlands," and upon this hinged the 
boundary line as far as the headwaters of Lake Champlain. 
The final settlement of this portion came in the "Webster- 
Ashburton treaty of 1842. 

The commissioners did not feel themselves empowered to 
settle the disputed boundary in the northeast, and the sov- 
ereignty of the islands in the Bay of Fundy was left un- 
settled. From the point which the commission had deter- 



56 JAY'S TREATY, 

mined as the mouth of the St. Croix to the ocean was twenty 
miles, across islands, some large and valuable, and some 
settled. Great Britain claimed jurisdiction over all of these 
with the exception of Moose Island, which was held by the 
little town of Eastport. The question of this boundary 
came up between Rufus King and Lord Hawkesbury in 
1803, and left unsettled. At the last moment, in the War 
of 1812, the British captured Moose Island with the hopes 
of retaining it as "spoils of war." In the treaty the island 
was retained and the boundary was left as unsettled as be- 
fore. Foi" a third time this question was given to a com- 
mission for settlement and only its lack of proper juris- 
diction is recorded. The importance and desirability of 
settling this question does not seem to have been realized. 
While the northwestern boundary was settled in 1846, the 
twenty miles of disputed boundary in the east remained as 
it did when the commission of Jay's treaty left it. On 
July 16, 1891, the Canadian cruiser "Dream" seized seven 
fishing boats on the charge they were fishing in Canadian 
waters. Much interest was aroused and a convention was 
drawn up between the United States and Great Britain at 
Washington on July 22, 1892. Article II of this convention 
provided for a commission to settle the boundary. "The 
phrasing of this convention furnishes in itself a most ex- 
cellent example of how a thing ought not to be done."** 
A meeting was held in July, 1893, and nothing resulted. 
The last meeting was held in 1895, and the only agreement 
reached was to report separately upon their proceedings. 
The result was that a full and detailed account of all opera- 
tions was made by the American commissioners and sub- 
mitted to the Department of State. At Washington a ra- 
tional boundary line was laid out, and according to this 
determination, range signals and monuments were actually 
erected. These remain and the acceptance of them in the 



'*T. C. Mendenhall, "Twenty Unsettled Miles in the Northeast 
Boundary." Proceedings of American Antiquarian Society, Vol. XI. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 57 

immediate neighborhood will make easier the work of some 
future commission. 

Articles VI and VII provided for commissions to settle 
the amount of the debt due British creditors before the 
Revolution and the amount due as an indemnity by Great 
Britain for the spoliation of American commerce. 

The commission on the confiscation of debts met in Phila- 
delphia, May 29, 1797, and was suspended on July 31, 1798. 
Some differences of opinion were to be expected, but the 
discussions developed personal feelings. Mr. Macdonald, 
one of the British commissioners, "who possessed a sense of 
duty unmitigated by a sense of proportion, " had made him- 
self disagreeable in many particulars. Matters reached an 
unbearable condition when he submitted a resolution declar- 
ing that from the beginning of the Revolutionary "War down 
to the time of the Treaty of Peace, the United States, what- 
ever may have been their relations with other powers, stood 
to Great Britain in a state of rebellion. Americans main- 
tained the principle that the Treaty of Peace was not a 
grant of our independence, but a recognition of it. The 
American commissioners took the resolution as an insult 
and withdrew. Upon March 29, 1802, our minister at Lon- 
don, Rufus King, was instructed to negotiate explanations 
for this article. His Britanic Majesty preferred, rather 
than negotiate such an article, to avoid further expense and 
discussion by fixing the debt, for which the United States 
was held responsible, at a given sum. Mr. King was so in- 
structed, and the convention of January 8, 1802, resulted.^^ 
One article provided for the continuance of the commission 
under the seventh article of Jay's treaty. In regard to the 
sixth article of the same treaty it was provided that the 
United States should pay six thousand pounds in three an- 
nual installments to relieve herself from the obligation 
thereby assumed. 



'° American State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. II. Vide Ap- 
pendix B, Explanatory Articles. 



58 JAY'S TBEATY, 

Of all the tribunals which sat under Jay's treaty, the 
one which was convened at London under the seventh article 
is the most important and interesting". The purpose of the 
commission was to dispose of the American claims against 
Great Britain for the captures made under the orders of 
council, and the British claims against the United States' 
failure to enforce neutrality. 

The persons composing this board were worthy of the 
question. Christopher Gore and William Pinckney were 
appointed from America, and John NichoU, succeeded by 
Maurice Swabley, and John Anstey represented Great Brit- 
ain. The fifth, chosen by lot, was John Trumbull of Con- 
necticut. 

The question of jurisdiction divided them for a time, 
but was settled by Lord Chancellor Loughborough in that 
"the doubt respecting the authority of the commission to 
settle their own jurisdiction was absurd, and that they must 
necessarily decide upon cases being within or without their 
competency. ' ' 

Other important questions were regarding contraband 
goods, rights of neutrals, and the finality of the decisions of 
the prize courts. In their solution, Pinckney 's discussions 
are pronounced by Wharton to be "finished models of judi- 
cial eloquence, uniting powerful and comprehensive argu- 
ments with a copious, pure and energetic diction." The 
session of the board had been interrupted from July 30, 
1799, to February 15, 1802, by the dissolution of the trib- 
unal under the sixth article. The work was closed February 
24, 1804, all business having been completed. The recovery 
from this commission is put at $11,650,000.^*^ Trumbull 
said: "The whole of this sum was promptly paid to each 
client, or his assignee ; for after a careful and accurate ex- 
amination of the merits of every case of complaint, the 
awards of the board were made in favor of each individual. 



^°This is variously estimated from $10,345,000 to $11,656,000. 
Moore gives the above. Vide American State Papers, Foreign Eela- 
tions, Vol. II, pp. 119-123. 



OE THE TBEATY OF 1794. 59 

in the form of an order to pay, and payable at the Treasury 
of Great Britain; nor do I recollect even to have heard a 
single complaint, of the delay of an hour, in any instance of 
an award presented for payment. "^'^ 

The total of the awards paid by the United States appear 
to have been $143,428.14. The main point in this settle- 
ment was that a government is liable to damages for a neg- 
lect to perform its neutral duties. This was the foundation 
of the awards made at Geneva in 1872. 

2. There were other principles of constitutional and 
international law which were brought out in this treaty of 
1794. Since this was the first treaty entered into by the 
United States under the present government, some questions 
of constitutional law would naturally be raised. 

The discretionary power of the House of Representa- 
tives in regard to voting appropriations for the execution 
of a treaty has nothing to do with the treaty proper, except 
that it was here raised for the first time. The declaration 
made by the House has been affirmed repeatedly in later 
years whenever treaties requiring extensive or important 
legislation have come up for discussion.®^ The question re- 
mains as unsettled by courts or legislature as it was in the 
year 1796. There is a parallel to this difficulty in the treaty- 
making power of the crown of England, which requires the 
Commons to vote appropriations to His Majesty's tracts. 
Any discretionary power which the Commons may have 
maintained has never been recognized by the King. 

Jay's treaty has been criticized by Lyman^^ as a treaty 
accomplishing nothing. But its material benefits have been 
given,®^ and in addition to the principles of international 
law which were raised or established, it confirmed the title 
of the United States to membership in the "family of 
nations." 



" John Basset Moore, ' ' American Diplomacy, ' ' p. 207 et seq. 

^^ Vide ' ' Eeports on the Law of Civil Government in Territory 
Subject to Military Occupation by the Forces of the United States," 
by Charles E. Magoon, 1903, for a list of these occasions and a dis- 
cussion of the principles involved. 

*' Lyman, "Diplomacy of the United States," p. 222. 

"" Supra Section 1. 



60 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

A spirit of international comity was here more strongly 
developed than at any previous period of relations with 
Great Britain. 

Under commercial regulations the intention to enter a 
blockaded port was declared no cause for condemnation.^^ 
The declaration that the ships of war of one of the con- 
tracting parties should be hospitably received and protected 
in the ports of the other was a courtesy in the general usage 
of nations here endorsed.^^ 

The treaty provides that British subjects, then owning 
lands in the territory of the United States, may continue 
to hold them according to their respective titles. And the 
Supreme Court held that these provisions are parts of the 
supreme law of the land, being a constitutional exercise of 
the treaty-making power."^ 

The ninth article provides that British subjects holding 
lands in the United States, and their heirs, so far as their 
lands are concerned, and the remedies incident thereto, shall 
not, as aliens, have their estates confiscated. The parties, 
hoM^ever, must show that the title of the land in question 
was in their ancestors when the treaty was made,^* although 
their actual possession was not necessary.®^ Nor was it 
necessary that present holders should become citizens,^" nor 
did the article intend to include any other persons than such 
as were British subjects or American citizens.^'^ Several 
cases were then raised in an attempt to reclaim lands upon 
the termination of the treaty by the War of 1812. But it 
was held that the termination of an international compact 
does not destroy property rights already vested under it.^^ 

From the policy of confiscating debts, many cases arose, 
especially in the south. The history of such acts is given in 

^14 Cranch 185. 

°^ Wharton, ' ' International Law Digest, ' ' Vol. II, p. 159. 

"' 7 Cranch 603. 

"1 Wheaton 300; 3 Peters 242. 

»' 7 Wheaton 534. 

»« 3 Wheaton 594. 

" 4 Wheaton 453. 

«' 8 Wheaton 464. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 61 

Gushing 's opinion^^ of November 24, 1790. The confiscation 
of the estates of American refugees, as described in the 
treaty, had been carried out. Part of the money had been 
paid creditors and the rest placed in the state treasuries. 
Such action was annulled by the treaty of peace and the 
British subjects had their estates restored and profits ac- 
counted for. All justice in debts had been given to British 
subjects and American citizens until paper money was sub- 
stituted. The effects of continental currency are well 
known. The proceedings of the commission settling this 
matter have been explained.^''^ The court holds that debts 
contracted, and interrupted by war, may be legally confis- 
cated, but such is not generally done from policy.^^^ 

One of the serious causes of complaint against the treaty 
was the admission of provisions as contraband of war.^*^=^ 
This was the principle Great Britain wished to establish, 
and which was endorsed by Wolfius and Vattel. It was 
never completely decided one way or the other. In general, 
the modern law holds them not contraband, but they may 
become so under circumstances arising out of peculiar con- 
ditions."^ 

Finally, an interesting question was raised during the 
negotiations as to the legal right of Great Britain to the 
slaves she had exported. The British negotiator not only 
claimed that by war property in movables was acquired 
as soon as such came within the enemy's lines, but that 
slaves were men, not property. ^°* This latter principle was 
never established in international law, but the question in- 
volved was decided in favor of Great Britain, and no in- 
demnity was given for the seizure of slave property. 

3. By depriving the south of this great factor in its 



°* Opinions of Attorney Generals. Cf. American State Papers, Vol. 
p. 224. 

"" Supra p. 57. 

"^ 2 Martin 's North Carolina Eeports, p. 83. 
^"= Vide p. 24. 

^"^ 1 C. Eobinson 189, High Court of Admiralty. 
^•^ American Historical Eeports, 1901, Vol. I, 



62 JAY'S TBEATY, 

agricultural production,"^ England carried out her policy 
of injury to American commerce. To counteract this pur- 
pose, America met monopoly with monopoly, restriction 
with restriction. There was a great danger to the United 
States in this conduct. ' ' To close to foreigners any of our 
ports, as many of them were closed to us, would mean the 
ruin of those ports and probably the immediate end of the 
nation.""" Our policy until 1790 had been to open our 
ports to all foreign nations and by granting commercial 
privileges, hoped to receive them. This policy failed, and 
the one of retaliation and restriction resulted. But our eco- 
nomic conditions prohibited the execution of this method, 
and Jay's treaty marks the first step to gain by negotiations 
what could not be won by favor or retaliation. Great Brit- 
ain was under a great advantage in this treaty from the 
fact that British commerce was established on an abundant 
experience, while ours lacked maturity and improvement. 

It was the commercial article which excited the greatest 
hostility. In addition to the objections that right of search 
and impressment were not prohibited, free ships did not 
make free goods and the lack of indemnity for commercial 
spoliations, there was the complaint against the price paid 
for limited privileges with the West Indies and the limita- 
tions of general carrying trade. 

In behalf of commercial interests, the Senate showed 
great wisdom and foresight in rejecting the twelfth article. 
By it ship-timber, tar, hemp, sails, and copper in sheets were 
declared contraband of war, although declared free in all 
other treaties between the United States and other nations. 
This would have limited our carrying trade with Europe in 
the following years when it was very important. By the 
article cotton was also prohibited from exportation. The 
importance of this produce was as yet unappreciated in the 
United States. Jay evidently did not know the industry 

"" Vide infra, Section 5. 

"° Thomas W. Page, ' ' Earlier Commercial Policy of the United 
States, ' ' Journal of Political Economy, Vol. X, p. 177. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 63 

had been started, or that it was of any considerable inter- 
est.^^'^ A small quantity was exported from Georgia in 
1783. In 1789 a member in Congress stated that the south- 
ern states were intending to cultivate cotton, and "if good 
seed could be procured, he believed they might succeed." 
It was not cultivated much for exportation until 1791 or 
1792, but from that date it had a rapid growth in commer- 
cial importance. ^"^ 

The advantages which were lost by the treaty were : The 
right of a special or general embargo, the right of seques- 
tration as far as Great Britain was concerned, the right of 
discriminating against British goods in favor of those of 
other nations, and the right of suspension of commercial 
intercourse was especially stipulated against, for a limited 
time. These restrictions were viewed with grave apprehen- 
sions by statesmen in opposition to relations with Great 
Britain. They were considered as limitations upon the na- 
tional sovereignty of the United States. 

These were the objections which seemed at the time to 
be well founded. But the distressful picture was over- 
drawn. On both sides the treaty created a disposition to 
try some other policy. Under Jefferson, our citizens be- 
lieved it would be best if governments would cease striving 
for the ascendancy of the sea, and permit the cheapest 
carrier to get the freight. Their reason was not economic, 
but rather a belief that America could carry at less cost 
than any other nation. 

In England it was found that the advantages of their 
treaty were failing to kill the wonderful vitality of the 
''Yankee marine, with no right to exist." The amount of 

"^ Lyman, "The Diplomacy of the United States," p. 220. 
wiii ^ Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, ' ' 
Pitkin. 

1791 189,316 lbs. 

1792 138,328 lbs. 

1793 487,600 lbs. 

1794 1,601,760 lbs. 

1795 6,276,300 lbs. 



64 JAT'S TBEATY, 

registered tonnage, employed in foreign trade, made rapid 
progress.^^'' This growth continued, notwithstanding the 
restrictions of Jay's treaty which had been finally assented 
to by the merchants as a means of obtaining compensation 
for their losses, otherwise than from the United States 
Treasury. It was also adopted as an alternative of war, 
which would have ruined one of the most thrifty periods in 
American commerce. 

The influence of the treaty is also apparent in our com- 
merce with France and England. The belief of Washing- 
ton's administration that British relations were of more 
value than French is materially justified from the following 
figures. The year and valuation of exports with France and 
her colonies is shown as follows : 

1797 $12,449,076 

1798 6,968,996 

1799 2,780,504 

1800 5,163,833 

With Great Britain and colonies : 

1797 $9,212,235 

1798 17,184,347 

1799 26,546,987 

1800 27,310,289 

The East India trade was found so satisfactory that no 
modification was made until the expiration of the commer- 
cial part of the treaty in 1807. In December of that year 
Pinckney and Monroe made slight changes, which lasted 
until April 30, 1811, when Parliament made complete regu- 
lations.^^" 

"° Pitkin, ' ' A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United 

States," p. 389. 

1793 367,734 tons 

1794 438,862 tons 

1795 529,470 tons 

1796 576,733 tons 

1797 597,777 tons 

1798 603,876 tons 

"" Pitkin, ' ' A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United 

States, ' ' p. 174. 



OE THE TREATY OF 1794. 65 

The war in which England was engaged with France in 
1793, with Spain in 1796, and which continued until all the 
nations of Europe were involved, threw into the hands of 
the American merchant a large part of the world's com- 
merce. This was carried on under the difficulties rendered 
by England's superior naval forces which she was allowed 
to use in default of prohibitory articles in Jay's treaty. 

4. The last matter for consideration under the effects 
of the treaty is its political result with the foreign nations 
interested in our relations with Great Britain. These na- 
tions were Spain and France. 

The actions of Spain were only such as were dictated by 
the French ministry and of minor consideration. At this 
period Spain held Louisiana, and her objection to Jay's 
treaty, especially the explanatory article of May 4, 1796, 
was the favor England received in the navigation of the 
Mississippi River. Spain deemed this sufficient cause for 
retaining garrisoned towns along the river and refusing to 
run out the boundary lines between her possessions and 
those of the United States. Any trouble which might have 
occurred was avoided by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso in 1800 
between France and Spain, in which Louisiana was ceded 
back to France. 

A far more active interest in Jay's negotiations and 
treaty was taken by the French nation. In America, the 
action of the party in sympathy with France reflected the 
hostility which was exhibited by that country against any 
amicable relations with Great Britain.^^^ 

Before war had been declared between these European 
nations in 1793, France formed the policy of injuring Great 
Britain through a close alliance, commercially and politi- 
cally, with the United States. Her treaty with America in 
1787 was an early step in this direction. When peaceful 
negotiations were decided upon between America and Eng- 
land, France made every possible objection. The letters 
^" Supra, p. 46. 



66 JAY'S TBEAT¥, 

from our minister at Paris to President Washington cau- 
tioned our government against the possible hostility of 
France. The other method by which her influence was ex- 
ercised on the administration was by her sympathizers in 
America.^^^ The party methods were radical/^^ and be- 
came more so when its partisans failed to hinder the admin- 
istration in its purpose. While the negotiations were going 
on in London, Genet, in America, was stirring up all pos- 
sible opposition, not only against the conjectured treaty but 
against the character of the men interested in the peaceful 
results of the mission. 

When the treaty was finished a copy was immediately 
demanded by the French government through our minister, 
Mr. Monroe. Jay very properly declined to reveal the un- 
ratified document, and French hostility increased. During 
the secret discussion in the Senate, the opposition grew and 
long detailed accounts relating to the political conditions 
Vt^ere sent by the French minister to his home government. ^^* 

Upon the publication of the treaty and the full knowl- 
edge of its contents, the red flames of opposition burst forth 
in all their fury. The presence of Monroe at Paris and the 
confidence the French ministry had in him as one of their 
sympathizers probably averted an immediate rupture. As 
it was, he was constantly employed in explanations and an- 
swering complaints of the French government.^^^ Although 
there were other accusations. Jay's treaty was the chief 
cause of complaint. All the detailed objections can be 
classed under two heads : the declaration of American neu- 
trality and the protection granted British interests in the 
United States-^^" 



^"Appendix D (3). 

"^ iSupra, p. 46. 

"^Appendix D (5). 

"' State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I. French Affairs, p. 559 
et seq. Cf. Lyman, "Diplomatic History of the United States," p. 
156 et seq. 

"° John Basset Moore, ' ' Diplomacy of the United States. ' ' 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 67 

The relations between the two countries became so dis- 
tant that the ministers of both were recalled. Adet was 
instructed to inform this government that the treaty of 1787 
was at an end. 

Serious trouble might have resulted but for the fact that 
France was so unstable in her government that it was im- 
possible to maintain a policy consistently and for any length 
of time. 

The French party in America, like Genet, carried its 
policy too far and produced a reaction upon the people.^^'^ 
The treaty was ratified,^^® notwithstanding the frenzied op- 
position, and the party passed away in becoming silence. 

5. But one other interest remains. There has been a 
natural tendency to omit the influences brought to bear upon 
the treaty of 1794, both in its making and in its ratification, 
by the slavery interests of the United States. This is ac- 
counted for by the fact that slavery is not mentioned in the 
treaty itself, and it is in this omission that the interest lies. 

The real significance of the negotiation in this respect 
lies not so much in the fact that by it the immediate event 
was changed as that upon this occasion the question made 
its earliest formal appearance in the diplomacy of the na- 
tion. A few claims^^^ had been made previously in its be- 
half, but for the first time in 1794 the public sentiment was 
brought definitely to bear upon the subject. 

The policy of the British during the war had been to 
weaken colonial power by depriving them of the services of 
their slaves. In conformity with this attitude. General 
Clinton and Lord Cornwallis issued a proclamation offering 
freedom to all slaves escaping into British lines. The effect 
was immediate and disastrous to agricultural interests. 
Virginia alone lost thirty thousand slaves in Cornwallis' 
invasion in 1778. Jefferson estimates that Georgia lost 



"^ Vide supra, p. 43. 

"'Appendix D (4). 

119 jj^irstj discussion followed for a decade under Adams with Car- 
marthen and Pitt, then Governeur Morris with Pitt and the Duke of 
Leads, finally Jefferson with George Hammond. American State Pa- 
pers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I, p. 188 et seq. 



68 JAY'S TREATY, 

seven-eighths of her negroes, and Ramsay is responsible 
for the statement that South Carolina, between 1775 and 
1783, lost twenty-five thousand slaves valued at twelve mil- 
lion five hundred thousand dollars.^-" 

After the surrender at Yorktown, the exportation of the 
negroes was a consistent finality to the British policy. A 
commission was appointed by Washington to watch the de- 
parture of British ships, but their inspections were ignored 
or prevented, and the theft of American slaves continued. 
It was for a compensation of such action that Jay was in- 
structed to exact an indemnity from England. 

In the negotiations, the slaves in question were divided 
into three classes: First, those captured and disposed of 
during the war, and concerning these both Grenville and 
Jay agreed that the United States had no interest ; second, 
those remaining with and belonging to Americans in the 
British lines. Jay claimed that as they belonged to and re- 
mained with Americans, even within the British lines, the 
treaty was fully applicable. The enemy had never taken 
them from their masters or treated them as booty, so prop- 
erty rights remained unchanged. Grenville was doubtful of 
the validity of such a proposition. The third class included 
those negroes who, confiding in the promise of freedom, fled 
to the British army. The greatest difficulty arose over this 
class. Jay maintained that their flight from American mas- 
ters and reception in the British lines did not extinguish 
their slave character. Grenville maintained all property 
crossing into British lines became British property, there- 
fore free. 

The question then resolved itself into whether the clause 
in the treaty of 1783 called for a restoration of all negroes 
in the British lines at the close of the war or applied to 
those who might fall into British hands after the treaty of 
peace. The right of the question was undoubtedly upon the 
British side, and they became firmer and more impressed 

^-'' American Historical Report, 1901, Vol. I, p. 273 et seq. Article 
by r. A. Ogg, "Jay's Treaty and the Slavery Interests of the United 
States. ' ' 



OB THE TEE AT Y OF 1794. 69 

with their argument as the negotiations proceeded. As a 
matter of the intentions of the negotiators of the treaty of 
peace the attitude of the United States was absolutely cor- 
rect. All negroes in the British lines were to be returned to 
their rightful American owners. 

The discussions between Jay and Grenville came to noth- 
ing. Jay was not the man to take particular delight in 
upholding the slavery interests of his country. He had ex- 
pressed himself^^^ that the United States must abolish slav- 
ery, or "their prayer to Heaven for liberty would be im- 
pious." The slavery question was reported by Jay as one 
of the subjects of existing differences, and the treaty with 
no compensation for the southern losses came into Congress. 

It is not surprising that the document met with animated 
resistance from the south. The debates in Congress dis- 
cussed the slave question thoroughly/ ^^ and the attitude of 
some of the southern states was too rabid to be reviewed 
with any pleasure. ^^^ Jay's treaty brought before the na- 
tion the differences of opinion and interest in this economic 
institution. These differences were culminated over a half 
century later in an internecine war. 

The commercial articles of the treaty went out of effect 
by their own stipulation on October 28, 1807. The entire 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was made null 
and void by the War of 1812. Its detriments and benefits 
have merged in the march of events. 

And what position had the treaty of 1794 in this pro- 
gress? 

Governments realize their efficiency through revolution 
and reconstruction. The Revolution of 1776 gave independ- 
ence to a new nation. The treaty of 1794 was a factor in 
the construction of its international relations and confirmed 
its status as a sovereign government. 

Both events have passed into history and, according to 
their importance, are enrolled in the annals of the nation. 

"^ American Historical Eeports, 1901, Vol. I, p. 282. 

^^^ Vide supra, pp. 39-40. 

^'■^ Ibid, and Appendix C (3). 



70 JAY'S TEEATY, 



APPENDICES. 



Appendix A. — Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence relating 
to the Treaty of 1794. 

Apfexdes B. — Synopsis of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navi- 
gation between Great Britain and the United States. 

Appendix C. — Extracts from the American papers published by the 
party in opposition, to the Treaty. 

Appendix D. — French diplomatic correspondence regarding Jay's 
Treaty. 

Appendix E. — A Map, with its consideration and explanation, relat- 
ing to certain stipulations in the Treaty of 1794. 



APPENDIX A. 



Extracts from the diplomatic correspondence relating to the Treaty 
of 1794. 

(1) May 6, 1794. Instructions to Jay as Envoy Extraordinary. 

(2) London, July 11, 1794. Jay to Alexander Hamilton. 

(3) London, November 19, 1794. Jay to Edmund Randolph. 

(1) Instructions to Jay as Envoy Extraokdinaey."* 

"Sir: — The mission upon which you are about to enter, as Envoy 
Extraordinary to the Court of London, has been dictated by consider- 
ations of an interesting and pressing nature. * * * 

A full persuasion is entertained that, throughout the whole nego- 
tiation, you vrill make the following its general objects: To keep alive 
in the mind of the British minister that opinion which the solemnity 
of a special mission must naturally inspire, of the strong agitations 
excited in the people of the United States, by the disturbed condition 
of things between them and Great Britain; to repel war. for which we 
are not disposed, and into which the necessity of vindicating our honor 
and our property may, but can alone, drive us; to prevent the British 
ministry, should they be resolved on war, from carrying with them the 
British nation; and, at the same time, to assert, with dignity and 
firmness, our rights, and our title to reparation for past injuries. 

^-* American State Papers, Foreign Belations, Vol. I, p. 427. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 71 

I. One of the causes of your mission being the vexations and 
spoliations committed on our commerce by the authority of instruc- 
tions from the British government, you will receive from the Secretary 
of State the following documents. * * * 

Compensation for all the injuries sustained, and captures, will be 
strenuously pressed by you. * * * 

If the British ministry should hint at any supposed predilection in 
the United States for the French nation, as warranting the whole or 
any part of these instructions, you will stop the progress of this sub- 
ject, as being irrelative to the question in hand. * * * 

II. A second cause of your mission, but not inferior in dignity to 
the preceding, though subsequent in order, is to draw to a conclusion 
all points of difference between the United States and Great Britain, 
concerning the treaty of peace. * * * 

III. It is referred to your discretion whether, in case the two 
preceding points should be so accommoda.ted as to promise the contin- 
uance of tranquillity between the United States and Great Britain, the 
subject of a commercial treaty may not be listened to by you, or even 
broken to the British ministry. If it should, let these be the general 
objects: 

1st. Eeciprocity in navigation, particularly to the West Indies and 
even to the East Indies. 

2d. The admission of wheat, fish, salt meat, and other great sta- 
ples, upon the same footing with the admission of the great British 
staples in our ports. 

3d. Free ships to make free goods. 

4th. Proper security for the safety of neutral commerce in other 
respects; and particularly: 

By declaring provisions never to be contraband, except in the 
strongest possible ease, as the blockade of a port; or, if attainable, by 
abolishing contraband altogether; 

By defining a blockade, if contraband must continue in some de- 
gree, as it is defined in the armed neutrality; 

By restricting the opportunities of vexation in visiting vessels; and 

By bringing under strictest management privateers ; and expediting 
recoveries against them for misconduct. 

5th. Exemption of emigrants, and particularly manufacturers, 
from restraint. 

6th. Free exports of arms and military stores. 

7th. The exclusion of the terms "the most favored nation," as 
being productive of embarrassment. 

8th. The convoy of merchant ships by the public ships of war, 
where it shall be necessary, and they be holding the same course. 



72 JAY'S TREATY, 

9th. It is anxiously to be desired that the fishing grounds now 
engrossed by the British should be opened to the citizens of the United 
States. 

10th. The intercourse with England makes it necessary that the 
liabilities arising from alienage in cases of inheritance should be put 
upon a liberal footing, or rather abolished. 

11th. You may discuss the sale of prizes in our ports while we 
are neutral; and this perhaps may be added to the considerations 
which we have to give, besides those of reciprocity. 

12th. Proper shelter, defence, and succor against pirates, ship- 
wreck, etc. 

13th. Full security for the retiring of the citizens of the United 
States from the British dominions in case a war should break out. 

14th. No privateering commissions to be taken out by the subject 
of the one, or citizens of the other party, against each other. 

15th. Consuls, etc., to be admitted in Europe, the West and East 
Indies. 

16th. In case of an Indian war, none but the usual supplies in 
peace shall be furnished. 

17th. In peace, no troops to be kept within a limited distance 
from the lakes. 

18th. No stipulation whatsoever is to interfere with our obliga- 
tions to France. 

19th. A treaty is not to continue beyond fifteen years. 

IV. This enumeration presents generally the objects which it is de- 
sirable to comprise in a commercial treaty ; not that it is expected that 
one can be effected with so great a latitude of advantages. * * * 

But if a treaty of commerce cannot be formed upon a basis as ad- 
vantageous as this, you are not to conclude or sign any such, it being 
conceived that it would not be expedient to do anything more than to 
digest with the British ministry the articles of such a treaty as they 
appear willing to accede to, referring them here for consideration and 
further instruction previous to a formal conclusion. ' ' 

(2) Jay to Alexander Hamilton. 
London, July 11, 1794. 
* * * "Appearances continue to be singularly favorable, but 
appearances merit only a certain degree of circumspect reliance. The 
delays occasioned by the new arrangement of the ministry cannot be 
of long continuance. Circumstances must soon constrain them to form 
some ultimate system relative to the United States; and although I 
have much reason to hope that it will be favorable to our wishes, yet I 
confess I am not without apprehensions that certain points not by us 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 73 

to be yielded will occasion difficulties hard to surmount. Personally I 
have every reason to be satisfied, and officially I have as yet no reason 

to complain. 

************ 

I will endeavor to accommodate rather than dispute; and if this 
plan should fail, decent and firm representations must conclude the 
business of my mission. As yet I do not regret any step I have taken. 
I wish I may be able to say the same at the conclusion. ' ' 

(3) Jay to Edmund Eandolph. 
London, November 19, 1794. 

"Sir: — The long expected treaty accompanies this letter. * * * 
The difficulties which retarded its accomplishment frequently had the 
appearance of being insurmountable; they have at last yielded to 
modifications of the articles in which they existed, and to that mutual 
disposition to agreement which reconciled Lord Grenville and myself 
to an unusual degree of trouble and application. They who have 
leveled uneven grounds know how little of the work afterwards ap- 
pears. * * * 

My opinion of the treaty is apparent from my having signed it. I 
have no reason to believe or conjecture that one more favorable to us 
is attainable. 

Perhaps it is not very much to be regretted that all our differences 
are merged in this treaty, without having been decided; disagreeable 
imputations are thereby avoided, and the door of conciliation is fairly 
and widely opened by the essential justice done, and the conveniences 
granted to each other by the parties. 

The term limited for the evacuation of the posts could not be re- 
stricted to a more early day; that point has been pressed. 

************ 

The 6th article was sine qua non, and is intended as well as cal- 
culated to afford that justice and equity which judicial proceedings 
may, on trial, be found incapable of affording. * * * 

The credit of some of the States having, to my knowledge, suffered 
by appearances of their being favorable to the idea of sequestrating 

British debts on certain occasions, the 10th article will be useful. 

* » * 

* * * The duration of this article (12) is short, but if we 
meet the disposition of this country to good humor and cordiality, I 
am much inclined to believe it will be renewed. The duration of the 
treaty is connected with the renewal of that article, and an oppor- 
tunity will then offer for discussing and settling many important 
matters. * * * 



74 JAY'S T BE ATT, 

It will give you great pleasure to hear that great reserve and deli- 
cacy have been observed respecting our concerns with France. ' ' 



APPENDIX B. 

Synopsis of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation be- 
tween Great Britain and the United States."' 

The introduction designates the purpose of the treaty and names 
the plenipotentiary from each county empowered to negotiate such. 

Article I. Establishes peace and friendship between his Britan- 
nic Majesty and the United States. 

Aeticl6 II. His Majesty consents to withdraw all his troops and 
garrisons from all posts and places vdthin the boundary lines assigned 
by the treaty of peace to the United States. The evacuation is to take 
place on or before the 1st of June, 1796. All settlers in those parts to 
enjoy private property rights and become citizens of the United States 
in one year unless allegiance is declared to His Britannic Majesty. 

Article III. Allows to His Majesty's subjects and the citizens of 
the United States, and to the Indians dwelling on either side of the 
said boundary line, freedom to pass and repass by land or inland navi- 
gation into the respective territories of the two parties. The country 
within the limits of the Hudson's Bay Company is excepted. Vessels 
belonging to the United States are not to be admitted into the ports 
of His Majesty's said territories, nor British vessels from the sea into 
rivers of the United States beyond the highest ports of entry for 
foreign vessels from the sea. The navigation of the ISIississippi, how- 
ever, is to be entirely free. Goods and merchandise shall be conveyed 
into the territories of His Britannic Majesty by American citizens, and 
into the territories of the United States by British subjects, subject 
to the regulations established by both parties. The article is intended 
to render local advantages to each country. 

Article IV. Provides for a joint survey of the Mississippi Eive/ 
to determine the northwest boundary line. 

Article V. Authorizes a commission of three members to deter- 
mine which is the river St. Croix, intended by the Treaty of Peace of 
1783 as part of the northeast boundary line. 

Article VI. Gives to British subjects the power of recovering 
debts due to them by American citizens previous to the treaty of 
peace; which debts have not been recovered hitherto, on account of 
some legal impediments. The United States agree to make full and 

125 rpjjg treaty in full may be found in the Annual Eegister, 1795, 
and State Papers, Foreign Kelations, Vol. I. 



OE THE TEE AT Y OF 1794. 75 

complete compensation to the creditors who have suffered by those 
impediments. The amount of the losses and damages is to be ascer- 
tained by five commissioners — two to be appointed by Great Britain, 
two by the President of the United States, and one by the other four. 
* '■' * Three of the said commissioners shall constitute a board, and 
shall have power' to do any act appertaining to the said commission, 
provided that one of the commissioners named on each side, and the 
fifth commissioner shall be present, and all decisions shall be made by 
the majority of the voices of the commissioners then present; eighteen 
months from the day on which the said commissioners shall form a 
board, and be ready to proceed to business, are assigned for receiving 
complaints and applications; but they are nevertheless authorized, in 
any particular cases, in which it shall appear to them to be reasonable 
and just, to extend the said term of eighteen months for any term not 
exceeding six months after the expiration thereof. The said commis- 
sioners shall first meet at Philadelphia, but they shall have power to 
adjourn from place to place as they shall see cause. 

The award of the said commissioners, or any three of them as 
aforesaid, shall in all cases be final and conclusive. 

Article VII. Allows indemnification, by the British government, 
to such of the citizens of the United States as have suffered, during 
the late war, by irregular and illegal captures. The United States also 
agrees to indemnify British subjects for irregular, illegal captures 
taken by American ships during the war. Five commissioners, acting 
under the same directions and oath as those in the preceding article, 
are to sit at LondoH upon all cases which have not been agreeably 
settled according to the letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, 
Philadelphia, September 5, 1793. 

Article VIII. Provides for the expenses of the commissioners in 
the sixth and seventh articles above and the filling of their vacancies. 

Article IX. It is agreed that British subjects who now hold 
lands in the territories of the United States, and American citizens 
who now hold lands in the dominions of His Majesty, shall continue 
to hold them according to the nature and terms of their respective 
estates and titles therein; and may grant, sell, or devise the same to 
whom they please, in like manner as if they were natives; and that 
neither they nor their heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect 
the said lands and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as 
aliens. 

Article X. Stipulates no debt, shares of public money, or public 
or private bank funds shall ever be confiscated or sequestered in na- 
tional differences. 

Article XI. Guarantees perfect liberty of navigation and com- 
merce among people of both countries under the following articles. 



76 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

Article XII. AUows the citizens of the United States to carry 
the produce of the United States to the West Indies, in vessels of not 
more than seventy tons burden. The citizens are also allowed to carry 
away the produce of the islands to the territories of the United States 
alone. This article is to continue in force for two years after the 
present war, when further regulations are to be made. (This article 
was suspended by the resolution of the Senate advising ratification, 
and the suspension was agreed to by Great Britain.) 

Article XIII. His Majesty consents that vessels belonging to 
American citizens shall be admitted to all seaports of the British ter- 
ritories in the East Indies. Said citizens may freely carry on a trade 
between said territories and the United States, in all articles of which 
the importation or exportation is not entirely prohibited. Provided 
only, that it shall not be lawful for them in time of war between 
Great Britain and any other state to export from said territories, 
without permission, any military or naval stores or rice. Coasting 
trade is prohibited and no higher duties are to be exacted than payable 
on British vessels. 

Article XIV. Reciprocal and perfect liberty of commerce and 
navigation is guaranteed between the United States and the European 
territories of Great Britain. 

Article XV. No higher duties shall be paid by the ships or mer- 
chandise of the one party in the ports of the other than the duties 
paid by other nations. No higher duties shall be paid upon impor- 
tation or exportation than the duties paid on the importation or ex- 
portation of similar articles, the product of other nations. 

Article XVI. Eelates to the appointment of consuls for the pro- 
tection of trade. 

Article XVII. Any vessel captured or detained on suspicion of 
having enemy's goods is to be taken to the nearest port, and if any 
such property is found, it alone is to be taken and the vessel allowed 
to proceed. Delay is to be prevented or properly compensated. 

Article XVIII. Decides what articles the term contraband can 
be applied to. When provisions are regarded as such and seized, the 
owners shall be made speedy indemnification. Any vessel sailing for 
a port with a cargo not contraband, not knowing the port blockaded, 
will be allowed to put to any other port unless she again try to enter, 
when she will be held, and when such port is surrendered returned to 
the owners. 

Article XIX. Provides for the security of the respective sub- 
jects and citizens, and for the preventing of injuries by men-of-war. 

Article XX. Eelates to the refusal of the respective parties to 
receive pirates into any harbors or towns, and to the seizure of goods 
and merchandise taken by pirates. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 77 

Article XXI. Stipulates ttat the subjects and citizens of two 
nations shall not do any acts of hostility against each other, and shall 
not accept commissions from foreign states or princes, to commit 
hostilities. 

Article XXII. Neither contracting party shall authorize any act 
of reprisal against the other, on complaint of injuries or damages, 
until the first party has presented a statement as proof thereof. 

Article XXIII. Eelates to the treatment of ships, officers, and 
crews, in the respective ports of the two powers. 

Article XXIV. Provides that privateers of nations at enmity 
with either of the two powers shall not arm their ships in the respec- 
tive ports of the two powers, or sell what they have taken. 

Article XXV. It is lawful for ships of war and privateers to 
take their captured ships into either party's ports and be there sub- 
ject to certain privileges and obligations and are to be assisted to an 
early departure. No merchant vessel is to be taken within cannon- 
shot of the coast, or full satisfaction is guaranteed. 

Article XXVI. In ease of war merchants and citizens or sub- 
jects of one are permitted to reside in the territory of the other nation 
and to continue their trade. 

Article XXVII. Agrees that the tvfo powers shall respectively 
deliver up persons charged with murder and forgery. 

Article XXVIII. Alluding to the preceding articles, this states 
that the first ten articles shall be permanent, and that the subsequent 
articles (the twelfth excepted) shall be limited in their duration to 
twelve years. The treaty is to be binding and obligatory as soon as it 
is ratified. 

Grenville (L. S.) 

November 19, 1794. John Jay (L. S.) 

Explanatory Articles. 

Article explanatory of Article III of the Treaty: 

May 9, 1796. — This article related to the passage of Indians into 
the territories of both nations. 

Article explanatory of Article V of the Treaty: 

June 5, 1798. — This article authorized the commission under Art- 
icle V to designate the source of the St. Croix Eiver in any manner 
they saw fit otherwise than by latitude and longitude. 

Convention for the payment of indemnities and settlement of 
debts : 

January 8, 1802. — This convention of five articles provides for the 
payment to Great Britain of £600,000 in full for the claims submitted 



78 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

under Article VI of the Treaty of 1794, and for the continuance of the 
commission under Article VII ; and it was agreed the awards should be 
paid in three annual installments ; furthermore, that creditors of either 
country should meet with no impediment in the collection of their 
debts. 

APPENDIX C. 

Extracts from the American papers published by the party in oppo- 
sition to the treaty. 

(1) Extract from the New Yorlc Journal, August 2, 1794. 

(2) Proceedings in Philadelphia according to the Democratic 

Printer, July 4, 1795. 

(3) The Eichmond Notice, July 31, 1795. 

(1) Extract from the New YorJc Journal. 
August 2, 1794. 
' ' The late appointment of John Jay, as Envoy Extraordinary to the 
Court of London, brought so strongly to the recollection of the people 
of this country his former iniquitious attempt to barter away their 
most valuable right, that they could not refrain from openly testifying 
their abhorrence of the man, whose appointment, at this critical period 
of their affairs, they consider as tragically ominous. Although they 
had not forgotten, nor even faintly remembered, his former act of 
treason against them; yet they hoped, from the ofS.ce he filled, he was 
in as harmless a situation as he could be placed; and that no effort 
of power or policy could drag him forward, so long as he held his 
office, and set him once more to chaffering with our rights. With 
these impressions, a number of respectable citizens, of this place and 
its vicinity, on Saturday last, ordered a likeness of this evil genius 
of western America to be made, which was soon well executed. At 
the appointed hour, he was ushered forth from a barber's shop, 
amidst the shouts of the people, dressed in a courtly manner, and 
placed erect on the platform of the pillory. In his right hand he held 
uplifted a rod of iron ; in his left, he held extended Swift 's last speech 
in Congress, on the subject of British depredation, on one side of 
which was written: 

'Nemo repente fuit turpissimus. ' Juv. Sat. IV, 33. 

'No man e'er reached the heights of vice at first.' 
And on the other : 

' — non deficit alter.' Virg. Aen. 6. 

'A second is not wanting.' 



OB THE TBEAT¥ OF 1794. 79 

About Ms neck was suspended by a hempen string Adam's defence 
of the American Constitutions, on the cover of which was written: 
' Scribere jussit aurum. ' Ov. Ep. 
' Gold bade me write. ' 

After exhibiting him in this condition for some time, he was or- 
dered to be guillotined, which was soon dexterously executed, and a 
flame instantly applied to him, which finding its way to a quantity of 
powder, which was lodged in his body, produced such an explosion 
that after it there was scarcely to be found a particle of the disjecta 
membra Plenipo. * * * 

The Club of Charleston, South Carolina, solicited an adoption of 
the Jacobin Club at Paris. They also addressed Consul Margourit, 
who had actually granted commissions to privateers, in defiance of the 
President's proclamation of neutrality." * 

(2) Proceedings in Philadelphia, According to the Democratic 

Printer. 

July 4, 1795. 
"At Philadelphia, on the 4th of July (the anniversary of the glo- 
rious Independence), Mr. Jay and the Senate were burnt in effigy. 
The mob, headed by one Abraham Coats, an old Whig, carried through 
the streets a transparent painting, of which the Democratic printer 
gave the following description: The figure of John Jay was upon it. 
The figure was in full statue, holding in his right hand a pair of scales, 
containing in one scale American Liberty and Independence, kicking 
the beam; in the other, British Gold, in extreme preponderance. In 
his left hand a treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, which he 
extended to a group of Senators, who were grinning with pleasure and 
grasping at the treaty. From the mouth of the figure issued these 
words, ' ' Come up to my price, and I will sell you my country. ' ' The 
figure was burned at Kensington amid the acclamations of hundreds 
of citizens. Thus ended the procession, and thus terminated the anni- 
versary of American independence." 

(3) The Eichmond Notice. 
July 31, 1795. 
Notice is hereby given, that in case the treaty entered into by that 
d — n'd Arch Traitor, J — n J — y, with the British tyrant should be 
ratified, a petition will be presented to the next General Assembly of 
Virginia at their next session praying that the said state may recede 
from the Union, and be left under the government and protection of 
One Hundred Thousand Free and Independent Virginians. 



80 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

P. S. — As it is the wish of the people of the said state, to enter 
into a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, with any other state, 
or states of the present Union, who are averse to returning again 
under the galling yoke of Great Britain, the printers of the (at pres- 
ent) United States are requested to publish the above notification. 

APPENDIX D."« 

French diplomatic correspondence regarding Jay's Treaty. 

(1) April 14, 1796. Le Ministre Plenipotentiaire de la Kepub- 

lique Frangaise (Adet) pres les Etats Unis, Au Minis- 
tre des Eelations Exterieures. 

(2) May 3, 1796. Le Ministre Plenipotentiaire de la Repub- 

lique Fran^aise (Adet) pres les Etats Unis, Au Minis- 
tre des Eelations Exterieures. 

(3) June 20, 1796. Le Ministre Plenipotentiaire de la Eepub- 

lique Frangaise (Adet) pres les Etats Unis, Au Minis- 
tre des Relations Exterieures. 
(1) April 14, 1796. 

Citoyen Ministre: Nos amis enfin viennent d 'adopter un Plan 
pour la rejection du Traite. Dans leur dernier Comite Secret, il a ete 
arrete que I'on feroit adopter par la Chambre Une resolution Congue 
a peu pres dans les termes suivans: "Attendu que le Traite conclue 
entre la Grande Bretagne et les Etats unis paroit injurieux aux in- 
terets des Etats; Attendu que la Chambre manque de documens neees- 
saires pour en porter un jugement different; Attendu que tons les 
renseignements qu'elle a demande a cet egard lui ont ete refuses, il 
est resolu qu'elle ne s'occupera pas des Loix relatives a ce Traite." 

Bientot, Citoyen Ministre, eette resolution sera soumise a la Cham- 
bre et aura la Majorite en sa faveur, s'il faut en croire les Membres 
les plus influans du parti republicain. Us m'ont assure qu'ils etoient 
certains de cinquante sept voix et que neuf membres de la Minorite 
etoient incertains sur le parti qu'ils avoient a prendre. 

Quoique nos amis ne paroissent pas douter du sucees, je n'ose pas 
vous le garantir, Citoyen Ministre; Je connois trop le caractere des 
Americains pour compter sur un aete de vigueur de la Chambre des 
representans ; et pour vous parler avec franchise, je serois etonne, si 
elle prend cette attitude fiere que veulent lui donner les chefs du parti 
Republicain. 



126 rpj^g French Correspondence, regarding the treaty of 1794, is 
abundant and much in detail. Enough of it is given in this Appendix 
to show the interest and trend of French action. 



OB THE TREATY OF 1794. 81 

Toute incertitude cependant cessera bientSt, Citoyen Ministre; la 
decision de la question qui s'agite maintenant a la Chambre, nous fera 
presager le sort de la resolution qui doit terminer toutes les discus- 
sions relatives au Traite de Jay. Un membre de la Minorite a pro- 
pose hyer que la Chambre des representans fit les loix necessaires pour 
1 'execution des Traites Conclus avec Alger, la Grande Bretagne, I'Es- 
pagne et quelques Nations indiennes. Cette proposition a excite des 
debats plus vifs que ceux qui avoient eu lieu jusqu'a ee jour; plu- 
sieurs amendemens out ete proposes; la division a ete demandee; mais 
le Comite general n'a pris encore aucune determination. 

Si celle qu'il adoptera en conforme aux viies de nos amis, s'ils ont 
la majorite dans cette circonstanee, il y a lieu de croire qu'ils I'obtien- 
dront, lorsqu'il s'agira de la grand resolution; car les hommes qui se 
seront prononces jusqu'a ce Moment dans le meme sens, ne pourront 
plus changer d 'opinion sans se deshonorer. 

Signe P. A. Adet. 

(2) May 3, 1796. 

Citoyen Ministre : C 'en est fait ; le parti de 1 'Angleterre triomphe, 
et la Chambre des representans a arrete avant hyer qu'elle feroit la 
loi relative a 1 'execution du Traite avec 1 'Angleterre. Vous trouverez 
cyjoint I'extrait de sa seance, et vous verrez qu'il s'en est pen fallu 
que nos amis ne restassent maitres du champ de bataille; lis etoient 
certains de la Victoire, Citoyen Ministre, si le Gouvernement f ran^ois 
s'etoit explique sur le traite, si les bruits de mon rappel n 'etoient 
venus appuyer les raisons des membres qui interpretoient le silence de 
la France en faveur du Gouvernement Americain, et qui avoient grand 
soin de dire que I'on avoit en consequence rien a redouter de la France, 
et tout a craindre de 1' Angleterre. En vain ai-je fait tons mes efforts 
pour detruire ces fausses impressions; je n'ay pu reussir: et quelques 
moyens que j 'eusse pu employer de concert avec nos amis, m 'etoit-il 
possible de ruiner les manoeuvres et les intrigues du Ministre d 'Angle- 
terre qui pouvoit user de deux armes ton jours victorieuses, la menace 
et la corruption. Elles ne luy ont ete que trop utiles, s'il faut que 
j'en croie les rapports qui m'ont ete faits; II n'est pas le seul qui 
s'en soit servi; Cent Marchands, m'a-t-on assure, ont fait une sou- 
scription de 500 Dollars chacun, pour acheter des souffranges en faveur 
du Traite. Les ont-ils distribues, ont-ils reussi, 1 'argent ou la crainte 
de 1 'Angleterre ont-ils decide la question? je ne puis vous expliquer 
ce mystere. Vainement ai-je cherche a le penetrer. Tout le monde se 
tait, et ceux qui avoient parle de la souscription des marchands il y a 
quelques jours, gardent aujourd'hui le silence, ne repondent que d'une 
maniere ambigue aux Questions qu'on leur fait, et laissent voir par 



82 JAY'S TREATY, 

la qu 'on leur a commande une discretion a laquelle ils ne s 'etoient pas 
cru d'abord obliges. 

Je ne saurois vous peindre, Citoyen Ministre, le chagrin de nos 
amis dans les circonstances actuelles; ils voyent la liberte fortement 
menacee chez eux, ils voyent le royalisme qui ne s'etait avance que 
lentement; pret a faire des progres rapides. Deja ses apotres parlent, 
deja les Senateurs et John Adams a leur tete, disent hautement que 
la monarchie est le seul Gouvernement convenable a tons les Peuples. 
Un Senateur de la minorite m'a rapporte confidemment qu'un de ses 
coUegues lui disoit un jour. Nous vous connoissons, vous ne serez 
jamais sujet; il faudra vous couper le cou ou vous faire roi. Nos 
amis voyent P or age destructeur de I'egalite se former peu a peu; ils 
auroient pu aisement dans les circonstances actuelles le dissiper; ils 
ne savent si plus tard ils en auront la puissance. lis craignent de 
succomber au milieu de leurs efforts ou de ne pouvoir retablir la liberte 
qu'en parcourant les diverses periodes d'une revolution dont on ne peut 
calculer les effets ni determiner la duree. Tant d'elemens divers peu- 
vent etre opposes I'un a 1 'autre dans les mouvemens d'une fermenta- 
tion interieure; 1 'influence des interets Europeens peut agir de telle 
sorte qu 'ils ne portent pas sans etre eff rayes leurs regards sur 1 'avenir. 
lis voyent deja le Peuple Americain en armes combattant pour la 
royaute, et la Eepublique arroser de son sang les campagnes qu'elle 
fertilisoit de ses sueurs; cette population d'esclaves qu'elle fertilisoit 
de ses seueurs; cette population d'esclaves qu'elle renferme dans son 
sein, ces tribus d'Indiens qui I'entourent, instrumens dont 1 'ambi- 
tion, la fureui", la vengeance peuvent s'emparer, ajoutent encore aux 
maux qu'il se fera lui-meme si des evenemens qu'on n'ose esperer ne 
viennent pas iuopinement a son secours. Et nous, Citoyen Ministre, 
qui ne pouvons esperer de tirer des avantages de ce pays qu'autant que 
le parti republicain dominera, a quoi devons nous nous attendre 
aujourd'hui? Nos interets vont etre plus violemment froisses que 
jamais. On nous a desservi constamment sous le manteau de la neu- 
tralite. Aujourd'hui on le fera ouvertement; on n'usera plus de strata- 
geme; on n'invoquera plus les ressources de la Chicane, les secours de 
la tourbe devorante des gens de loi, la partialite des Tribunaux; on 
n'en appellera aux Traites Anglais dans tons les cas ou nous recla- 
merons centre les faveurs accordees a nos ennemis; nous les verrons 
jouir des avantages que nous etions assures exclusivement par nos 
Traites, et nous en serons prives nous memes. Deja, je vols que I'on 
se dispose a empecher les corsaires de vendre leurs prises aux Etats 
Unis. Deja le Consul Anglais a Charleston a demande qu'on fit 
arreter la vente d'une prise faite par un de nos corsaires, non par- 
cequ'il avoit ete arme aux Etats Unis, mais parceque Particle 25 du 



OE THE TBEATY OF 1794. 83 

Traite conclu avec la Grande Bretagne empeche les ennemis de cette 
puissance d'amener et de conduire leurs prises aux Etats Unis. Les 
Officiers du Gouvernement hesitent, ils n'ont pas dissimule leur em- 
barras a notre consul, et cependant le meme article 25 du Traite 
Anglais leur dicte leur decision; mais ils craignent de deplaire a 
1 'Angleterre, et je ne doute pas de voir realiser ce que j'avois prevu 
dans mon N° 1"'* au Comite de Salut public, sur 1 'admission de nos 
prises aux Etats Unis, a cette violation de nos traites, sans doute on 
ajoutera de nouvelles vexations, et nous verrons la nation Frangaise 
triomphante et respectee en Europe, recevoir ici des affronts d'un gou- 
vernement timide et laclie que la crainte seuls gouverne, et qui 
s'humilie tou jours devant la main qui le frappe. Mais, Citoyen Minis- 
tre, devons nous souffrir que ce gouvernement qui a trahi notre bonne 
foi, qui s'est joue de notre moderation, joigne de nouveaux outrages 
a ses perfidies, et pour parvenir a 1 'execution de ses projets, force le 
Gouvernement Frangais de rompre avec lui? Non, sans doute, I'in- 
teret de notre gloire, de notre dignite, I'interet meme dvi peuple 
Americain, que nous devons sauver de 1 'oppression comme nous y 
avons arrache le peuple Batave, nous impose, ce me semble, 1 'obliga- 
tion de mettre un frein a I'audace du parti Anglais et de tourner 
contre lui-meme les armes dont il s'est servi contre nous. 

En effet, Citoyen Ministre, Qui a engage le Gouvernement a faire 
un Traite avec Londres? Le parti Anglois. Qui a fait ratifier le 
Traite par Washington? Le parti Anglois. Qui s'est agit6 pour 
faire passer ce traite a la Chambre des representans ? Le meme parti. 
De quels gens est-il compose? Des Anciens Torrys, des negocians 
venus de la Grande Bretagne, des Presidens, Directeurs et Interesses 
de la Banque, des compagnies d 'assurance des Marchands. Ces hom- 
mes seuls ont des interets sur les batimens expedies en Angleterre; ce 
ne sera done que sur ces hommes que peseront les mesures que je vous 
propose, et ce ne sera pas le peuple n'a rien a se reprocher qui en 
souffrira. * * * 

Je ne sais pas, Citoyen Ministre, comment il seroit possible autre- 
ment, de parer aux inconveniens qui naissent pour nous de 1 'union des 
Etats Unis avec la Grande Bretagne; comment nous pourrons regagner 
ce que nous avons perdu par notre faute, la preponderance a laquelle 
nous avions tant de droits. Une rupture conduiroit-elle a ce but? Non, 
sans doute; le gouvernement saisiroit avec empressement cette occa- 
sion pour eloigner a jamais le peuple de la France, pour le lier plus 
etroitement avec 1 'Angleterre. * * * 

II faut, je pense, Citoyen Ministre, ne pas perdre cet objet de vue, 
et nous rappeller que si la France est agricole, elle est aussi manu- 
facturiere, qu'elle a besoin d 'exporter le produit de son Industrie; 



84 JAY'S TREATY, 

que ce vaste continent presente des debouches infinis, si elle sait se 
les assurer, et qu 'y menageant avec soin ses interets, elle peut s 'appro- 
visionner seule tout le tems oil il n'aura tas de manufacture, et le 
tems est oncore eloigne. Ces diverses considerations viennent done a 
I'appui de ma proposition et me la font regarder comnie seule admis- 
sible dans ce moment surtout, ou nous ne devons pas chercher une 
nouvelle guerre, et ou I'honneur et I'interet de la nation ne me parois- 
sent pas permettre de garder le silence sur la conduite du gouverne- 
ment Americain. 

(3) June 20, 1796. 

On vient de me procurer une eopie des Instructions de Jay a lui 
donnees par le Secretaire d'Etat, lors de son depart pour 1 'Angleterre. 
Je m'empresse de vous les envoyer. 

Si vous vous donnez la peine de les comparer avec le Traite que ce 
Ministre a conclu avec le Ministre Anglais, vous verrez, Citoyen Minis- 
tre, qu'il a pris une marche toute opposee a celle qui lui etait tracee; 
et qu'il a souscrit a des conditions qu'il ne devait pas accepter. 

Quel motif a pu determiner Jay a recevoir la loi du Ministre 
Anglais ? Usant de la latitude qui lui etait donnee par un des articles 
de ses Instructions, a-t-il substitue sa volonte individuelle aux vo- 
lontes bien exprimees de son Gouvernement ? L 'affection qu'il porte 
a 1 'Angleterre a-t-elle triomphe seule de son devoir? la corruption 
a-t-elle agi sur lui? ou etait -il porteur d 'instructions secretes du Presi- 
dent ignorees du Secretaire d'Etat et connues seulement de Wash- 
ington et de son Conseil particulier Hamilton? Je serais tente de le 
croire, Citoyen Ministre, autrement comment expliquer la contradiction 
qui existe dans la conduite du President, quand on le voit signer un 
Traite contraire aux ordres qu'il avait donnees? Si, conformement a 
la demande de la Chambre des Eepresentans, il lui avait remis les In- 
structions et autres pieces relatives a la mission de Jay, on aurait deja 
developpe ce mystere ; mais j 'y parviendrai peut etre, si comme on me 
1 'a promis, on me montre la correspondance de Jay avec le Lord Gren- 
ville et les dernieres Instructions que lui a donne le President. Alors, 
Citoyen Ministre, je parlerai d'apres des faits et non sur de simples 
conjectures. 

II est inutile, Citoyen Ministre, que j 'entre dans aucun detail sur 
ces Instructions, les reflexions qu 'elles font naltre se presentent d 'elles- 
memes. Je me bornerai a vous faire remarquer que le President par 
1 'importance qu'il attache a la paix avec Alger, par les demarches 
qu'il prescrit a son Envoye pour arriver a ce but, repond aux voeux 
des Americains qui tons desirent naviguer dans la Mediterrannee. 
Notre interet nous permet-il, Citoyen Ministre, de leur laisser usurper 



OB THE TEE ATT OF 1794. 85 

un Commerce qui par notre position et nos anciennes liaisons doit 
nous appartenir exclusivement et que pour la properite de la Eepu- 
blique nous devons conserver. Je en le crois pas, Citoyen Ministre, 
mais je me contente de vous presenter seulement eette question dont 
Totre sagesse trouvera la solution la plus avantageuse a notre patrie. 

Salut respectueux, 

Signe P. A. Adet. 

APPENDIX E. 

A Map, with its consideration and explanation relating to cer- 
tain STIPULATIONS IN THE TREATY OP 1794. 

Consideration of the Map.- — An exhaustive search authorizes the 
statement that no map has ever been made which considered at once 
the location of the British forts, the disputed boundary lines, and the 
territory held by the British in 1794. Prom sources stated in the bibli- 
ography enough evidence has been gained to supply a map illustrating 
these interests. 

Ten forts were to be abandoned. Fort Eecovery was mentioned by 
Eandolph, Secretary of State, in a letter'^' to John Jay, dated August 
18, 1794. Tt is also mentioned in Stephens' "Pictorial History" as 
built by General Wayne in 1793 near the scene of the St. Clair 
disaster. 

Great Sodus Fort is located by a letter'"' from Eandolph to the 
same party, dated August 30, 1794. 

Fort Miami, on the rapids of the Maumee Eiver, was also men- 
tioned in the same. 

Eandolph, in a letter'-' addressed to Jay and dated December 19, 
1794, objects that Detroit is still held by the British as well as other 
forts above mentioned. 

President Washington in his address''^ to the United States Senate 
and House of Eepresentatives on December 7, 1796, mentions three 
other forts which have been evacuated — Oswego, Niagara, and Michili- 
makinac, or Mackinac.''^^ 

Fort Oswegatichie on the St. Lawrence Eiver and Point-au-f er and 
Dutchman's Point on Lake Champlain are mentioned in Jefferson's 
letter'^" of objections, May 29, 1792, to Hammond, the British consul. 

In his letter to the same party on December 15, 1791, Jefferson 
mentions Fort Erie as one of those to be abandoned, but in his letter 

'" State Papers, Foreign Eolations, Vol. I. 

"^ Eichardson 's ' ' Message and Papers of the Presidents. ' ' 

"' It was so called in the War of 1812, when it received the appel- 
lation, ' ' The American Gibraltar, ' ' as one of the strongest positions in 
the United States. 

'™ State Papers, Foreign Eolations, Vol. I. 



86 JAY'S TEE AT Y, 

of May 29, 1792, he corrects himself in that Fort MicMlimakinac was 
the one intended."^ A glance at the map shows the reason for this 
mistake as well as how slight Jefferson's knowledge of the forts must 
have been at that time. Port Erie was a British fort upon British 
territory. 

The boundary question is much easier to deal with. By the Treaty 
of Peace in 1783 it was stipulated that a line due westward from the 
Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi Eiver should constitute the 
northwestern boundary line of the United States. In Jay's letter"" 
to Lord Grenville on the 4th' of September, 1794, he objects that the 
northwestern boundary line does not close, as the Mississippi does not 
extend far enough north to allow a line "due west" from the Lake 
of the Woods to intersect it. The Mississippi Eiver had not been ex- 
plored farther than the forty-fifth degree of latitude, or one degree 
above the Falls of St. Anthony, so a commission was agreed upon for 
a survey to ascertain the source of the river. Three sources"" were 
conjectured: Marshy Lake, near the forty-fifth degree of latitude; 
White Bear Lake, near the forty-sixth degree; and Eed Lake, or La- 
hontan 's Mississippi, near the forty-seventh degree of latitude. 

Undoubtedly there was either a mistake in regard to latitude, 
which is very probable, or in regard to the names of the lakes, which 
might easily have been changed. Eed Lake is on the map but nearer 
the forty-eighth degree than the forty-seventh degree of latitude. 
There is a White Bear Lake about the forty-fifth degree, but far too 
small to be noted as the source of the Mississippi, and also has the 
main stream of the Mississippi running by it. What is now known as 
Mille Lacs was probably then called Marshy Lake and is in the forty- 
sixth degree rather than the forty-fifth degree. Lake Winnibigoshish, 
forty-seventh degree, is probably the one then designated as White 
Bear Lake, forty-sixth degree. The reasons for these assumptions are 
location, size, and the tribiitary in the case of Mille Lacs, and the 
main river in the case of Lake Winnibigoshish. Eed Lake can be 
accounted for only in size and possible tributary connection. Big 
Stone Lake, where Marshy Lake is indicated and questioned, is the 
only lake near the forty-fifth degree of latitude which has any large 
connection with the Mississippi, and its consideration as a source of 
the Mississippi by the surveyors in the last half of the eighteenth 
century is very doubtful indeed. It must be remembered that the in- 
accuracies of the maps (Mitchell's) which Mr. Jay and Lord Gren- 
ville used were responsible for much of their trouble, and the territory 

"^ Lyman in his ' ' American Diplomacy ' ' evidently overlooked this 
correction. He names Erie as a fort to be abandoned, omitting Great 
Sodus, Miami, and Eecovery. 

"- State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol, I. 



OB THE TBEATY OF 1794. 87 

over which they negotiated has been rendered more difficult of study 
by the civilization and progress of a thrifty country for one hundred 
and twelve years. 

The last question for consideration in the map was the northeast 
boundary line of the United States. This had been determined upon 
in the Treaty of 1783 as the St. Croix River, but it was impossible to 
determine which stream was really the St. Croix. A commission was 
provided for in Jay's treaty, and brought in its report on the 25th 
of October, 1798. This report determined that the river previously 
known as the Scoodiac, or Schoodiac, was the St. Croix River intended 
in the Treaty of 1783. 



88 JAY'S TREATY, 



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PEIMAEY. 

Adams, C. F. 

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Adams, John Quincy. 

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Adams, H. 

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Albany Law Register. Volume XVII. Dr. Spears on Extradition. 
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American State Papers, Foreign Relations. Volumes I, II. '■ 
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Volume XI. 
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Ames, Fisher. 

"WorJcs." 2 volumes. Boston, 1854. 
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Annual Register. 131 volumes. London, 1807. Volumes 36, 37, 38, 40. 

Attorney Generals of the United States, Official Opinions of. Gushing 's 

Opinion, Vol. VI. 
Benton, Thomas H. 

Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 1789-1856. 16 volumes. 
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Chalmer, George. 

An Estimation of the Composite Strength of Great Britain from 
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Coxe, Trench. 

American Examiner on the Conditions of Great Britain. Phila- 
delphia, 1794. 
Corbett, William. 

Porcupine Works. 12 volumes. London, 1801. Vol. II. 



OB THE TBEAT¥ OF 1794. 89 

Compilation of Treaties in Force. Prepared under resolution of the 

Senate, February 11, 1904. Washington, 1904. 
Conway, M. D. 

Writings of Thomas Paine. 4 volumes. New York and London. 
Vol. III. 
Dallas, A. J. 

In the Library of Congress. Miscellaneous Pamphlets, Vol. I. 
Dexter, Franklin B. 

The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, President of Yale College. 3 
Volumes. New York, 1901. Edited by the corporation of Yale 
University. Vol. III. 1782-1795. 
Elliot, J. 

Debates. 5 volumes. Philadelphia, 1888. Vol. IV. 
Executive Documents. 

Third Congress, First Session. 
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First Congress, Third Session. 
Federalist, The. By Hamilton, Jay, and Madison. Philadelphia, 1818. 
Ford, P. L. 

Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 10 volumes. London and New 
York, 1892. Vol. VI. 
Gibbs, G. 

Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and Adams. 2 vol- 
umes. New York, 1846. Volumes I, II. 
Grenville Correspondence. ^ 

Historical Manuscripts published by the Eoyal Commission in i ^ *^..^ 

London, 1892-1899. 3 volumes. Preserved by J. B. Forteseue. j ^v\^\ ^'S^ 
Volumes II, III. > ^^ 

Hall, W. E. 

International Laiu. 3rd edition. 1890. 
Hamilton, J. C. 

WorJcs of Alexander Hamilton. 7 volumes. New York, 1850. Vol- 
umes IV, V, VII. 
Hansard, T. C. 

Parliamentary Debates. London, 1820. Volumes 30, 31, 32. 
Hart, A. B. 

American History Told by Contemporaries. 4 volumes. New York 
and London, 1901. Vol. III. 
House Docv/inents. 

Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session. 



'jr- 



90 JAY'S TREATY, 

Jay, William. 

The Life of John Jay with Correspondence and Papers. 2 volumes. 
1833. 
Johnston, A. 

Bepresentative American Orations. 3 volumes. New York and 
London, 1886. Vol. I. 
Johnston, Henry P. 

Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay. 4 volumes. New 
York and London, 1891. Volumes III, IV. 
King, B. C. E. 

Life and Correspondence of Eufus King. 6 volumes. New York, 
1894. Vol. L 
Maedonald, William. 

Select Documents Illustrative of the History of the United States. 
New York, 1898. 
McCuUock, J. E. 

Select Collection of Early English Tracts. London, 1856. 
Madison, J. 

Letters and Other Writings. 4 volumes. Philadelphia, 1867. Vol. 
III. 
Maepherson, David. 

Annals of Commerce. 4 volumes. London, 1805. Vol. IV. 
Monroe, James. 

Writings. 7 volumes. New York and London, 1903. Vol. I. 
View on the Conduct of the Executive, 1794-1796. Philadelphia, 
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Morris, Gouverneur. 

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Eandolph, Edmond. 

Vindication of Eandolph' s Eesignation, 
Eeports : 

Bee's Admiralty Court. 
Circuit Court, Paine, I. 
Court of Claims, Vol. 11. 
New YorTc Supreme Court, Johns, IX. 
United States Supreme Court: 
Cranch 4, 7. 
Howard 15. 
Peters 3. 
Wheaton 1, 3 ,4, 7, 8, 9. 



OE THE TEE AT Y OF 1794. 91 

Eichardson, James D. 

A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789- 
1899. Washington, 1903. Vol. L 

Sparks, Jared. 

The Worlds of Benjamin FranMin. 10 volumes. Boston, 1840. 
Volumes IX, X. 

Writings of Washington. 2 volumes. Boston, 1840. 

Life and Correspondence of Gouverneur Morris. 3 volumes. Bos- 
ton, 1832. 

Stanhope, Lord. 

Life of Pitt with Extracts from His Papers. 3 volumes. London, 

1879. 
Statesman's Manual. E. Williams, compiler. 4 volumes. New York, 

1854. Vol. I. 

Stephens, J. A. 

Albert Gallatin. Boston, 1884. 

Scott, J. B. 

Cases on International Law. Boston, 1902. 

Trumbull, John. 

Autobiography, Eeminiscences, and Letters. New Haven, 1841. 

Twiss, Travers. 

Law of Nations. Oxford, 1884. 

Wait. 

State Papers, 1789-1837. 2nd edition. 

Washington, H. A. 

Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 9 volumes. Washington, 1853. 
Volumes III, IV, IX. 

Williston, E. B., 

Eloquence of the United States. New York, 1829. Vol. I. 

Wharton, Francis. 

State Trials of the United States During the Administration of 
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Wharton, Francis. 

A Digest of the International Law of the United States, taTcen 
from Documents * * * and Decisions. 3 volumes. 2nd 
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92 JA¥'S TREATY, 

SECOND AEY. 

Adams, H. C. 

Taxation of the United States, 1789-1816. Baltimore, 1884. 

Adams, H. 

History of the United States of America (during the administra- 
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American Historical Association. 

Vol. III. Eeports of 1884. New York and London, 1886. 

Vol. I. Eeport of 1901. Washington, 1902. 
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An Examination of the Conduct of Great Britain Toward the Neu- 
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American Navigation. New York, 1902. 
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English Merchants. London, 1898. 
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Historic Americans. New York (c. 1899). 
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Treaty MaTcing Power. 2 volumes. New York, 1902. Vol. I. 
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History of New Yorli. 2 volumes. 1840. Vol. II. 
Dyer, T. H. 

History of Modern Europe. 5 volumes. London, 1888. Vol. V. 
Fiske, John. 

Essays Historical and Literary. 2 volumes. New York, 1902, 
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Lives of Chief Justices. 2 volumes. New York, 1875. Volumes 
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Century of American Diplomacy. Boston, 1902. 
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Beference to Presidential Administrations. New York, 1885. 
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Boundaries of the United States. Washington, 1885. 



OK THE TREATY OF 1794. 93 

Garland, Hugh A. 

John Eandolph. 2 volumes. New York, 1854. Vol. I. 
Gay, S. H. 

James Monroe. Boston, 1884. 
Gee, Joshua. 

Trade and Navigation of Great Britain. 3rd edition. 
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British Commerce. London, 1899. 
Gilman, D. C. 

James Monroe. Boston, 1883. 
Gordon, Thomas F. 

Digest of Treaties and Statutes of the United States Relative to 
Commerce, Navigation, and Revenue. Philadelphia, 1830. 

Gordy, John P. 

Ristory of Political Parties in the United States. 3 volumes. Co- 
lumbus, Ohio, 1895. Vol. I. 
Hamilton, J. C. 

The History of the Republic of the United States. 7 volumes. 
New York, 1857-64. Volumes V, VI. 
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The Formation of the Union, 1750-1829. London, 1893. 
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The Constitutional History and Government of the United States. 
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94 JAY'S TREATY, 

Lalor, J. J. 

Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and Political 
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Influence of Sea Power on History. Boston, 1893. 

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American Diplomacy. New York and London, 1905. 

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Pellew, Geo. 

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A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States. Hart- 
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OE THE TBEATY OF 1794. 95 

Eaumer, F. L. G. von. 

America and the American People. Trans, from the German by 
W. W. Turner. New York, 1846. 
Eive, W. C. 

James Madison. 3 volumes. Boston, 1881. Vol. III. 

Eoosevelt, T. 

Gouverneur Morris. New York, 1890. 

Schouler, E. 

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A History of the United States of America. 6 volumes. New 
York, Cop., 1899. Vol. I. 
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Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy. Boston, 1894. 

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Story, J. 

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The Life and Times of John Jay. New York, 1887. 



96 JAY'S TEE ATT, 



BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE MAP. 



American State Papers, Foreign Eelations, Vol. I. 

Lord Grenville's Correspondence. (See Essay Bibliography.) 

Personal Correspondence with J. W. H. Holcombe/^^ County Clerk of 

Clinton County, Plattsburgh, N. Y. 
Eichardson's "Messages and Papers of the Presidents." 
Tyler, M. C, Professor of History at Cornell University, "Library of 

Universal History," Vol. XI. 
Stephens, A. H., "Pictorial History of the United States," 1882. 
Cram's "Unrivaled Atlas of the World." Ed. by H. S. Stebbins. 

1889. 
Band, McNally & Co.'s "Unrivaled Atlas of the World," 1901. 
Watson's "New and Complete Atlas of the World," 1885. 



n 



^^ Mr. Holeombe is one of those obliging public citizens to whose 
knowledge, local enthusiasm, and patriotism I wish to make fuU ac- 
knowledgment for the only authentic information regarding Dutch- 
man's Point. An exhaustive search in the University Library and 
City Library of San Francisco with the kind assistance given there 
failed to reveal any information concerning the fort except that it was 
on Lake Champlain. Mr. Holeombe writes in part : 

" Plattsburgh, N. Y., Jan. 22, 1906. 
' ' Mr. Eobert Eankin, 

Dear Sir: — In reply to yours of the 8th, would say that I am 
unable to locate Dutchman's Point exactly, but I think it where there 
was a blockhouse in the Eevolutionary War on the west shore of North 
Hero (North Island). Point-au-fer is where I have marked it on the 
map, and it is called by that name to-day. Palmer 's History of Lake 
Champlain refers to Point-au-fer and the Blockhouse as being the two 
places held by the British after their evacuation of the country. ' ' 

On the map sent to him he has located the forts as in the small 
corner map of this essay. He writes : 

* ' Point-au-fer, four miles south of the Canadian line. ' ' 

' ' Probable location of Dutchman 's Point about twelve miles south 
of Canadian line on the west shore of North Hero (or North Island)." 



TRE TBEATY OF 1794. 99 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Introduction ■»■ 

Part I. The narrative history of the treaty 4 

Section 1. Conditions rendering negotiations necessary 4 

Section 2. Jay's appointment, departure and journey to 

London ^ 

Section 3. London, and the arrangements with Lord Gren- 

ville - 9 

Section 4. The negotiations in general and the return of the 

treaty ^ 

Section 5. The treaty in America 11 

Part II. The political history of the treaty 14 

Section 1. Causes of the treaty 15 

(a) Desires for a commercial treaty 15 

(6) Commercial spoliations 17 

(c) Treaty violations - 18 

(d) Political agitations - ■' 20 

Section 2. The negotiations 21 

(a) The breaking of the treaty of 1783 22 

■(&) The slavery question 23 

(c) The question of impressment 24 

(d) Contraband of war - 24 

Section 3. The treaty 26 

(a) Article by article 26 

(6) As a whole 34 

Section 4. The treaty in the United States 37 

(a) Advice of the Senate 38 

(&) Eatffication by the President 40 

(c) Appropriation by the House of Eepresentatives 41 

(d) Attitude of the people 45 

Opposition 45 

Defense 49 

Section 5. The treaty in Great Britain 51 



( 



100 JAY'S TBEATY. 

PAGE 

Part III. Eesults of the treaty 53 

Section 1. The execution of articles providing for 

(a) Evacuation of forts 54 

(&) Eelations with Indians - 54 

(c) Fixing of boundaries 54 

(d) Payment of debts 57 

Section 2. Questions of constitutional and international law 59 

Section 3. Commercial interests — - 61 

Section 4. Foreign relations 65 

(a) Spain 65 

(& ) France 65 

Section 5. Influence of slavery interests 67 

Conclusion 69 

Appendices 70 

Bibliography 88 

Bibliography for the Map 96 

Map 97 

Table of Contents 99 



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